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From a Panacea to a Panopticon: The Use and 
Misuse of Technology in the Regulation of Judges 
AMNON REICHMAN, YAIR SAGY, & SHLOMI BALABAN† 
This Article reveals the untold story of Legal-Net, Israel’s cloud-based judicial management 
system. While scholarly attention has thus far focused on the narrow question of the impact 
technology may have on judicial decision-making or on efficiency, little has been written on the 
manner in which technology affects the regulation and management of judges and the 
administration of justice as a whole. Through a combined historical analysis and interview 
methodology, we trace the development of Legal-Net from the early 1990s and situate it within a 
theoretical law-and-technology context. Detailing Legal-Net’s trajectory provides meaningful 
insights as to the relationship between regulation, technology, and the judicial role. More 
specifically, it unearths four approaches to technology as a regulatory tool, harnessed by the 
state to govern the public sector itself (and in particular, the production of justice): the 
bureaucratic/administrative approach, the structural approach, the managerial/integrative 
approach, and the normative approach. While distinct, these approaches interlace and 
demonstrate that the processes through which organizational technology is developed and 
implemented are far from value-neutral. The emerging technological ecosystem and in 
particular the “technological gaze”—the omnipresent data collection via managerial 
technology—have considerable implications on the manner in which judges are nudged to 
comply with expectations. The research further reveals that, as a new technological ecosystem 
was established, so was the internal perspective of judges regarding the judicial function 
transformed: from “retail” justice to “wholesale” provision of dispute resolution services 
(under the law). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Today, when a judge in Israel hears a case, virtually all her actions are 
channeled through Legal-Net: a digital, online, and all-encompassing platform. 
With the noticeable exception of the Supreme Court,1 Legal-Net pervades the 
totality of the Israeli judicial system. It is the central venue through which 
litigants, attorneys, court secretariats, judges, and court administrators interact 
in each phase of the judicial process. While performing some productivity 
functions, Legal-Net is, at its core, a management system that monitors the 
entire span of the production of justice. It nudges, sometimes prods, and 
overall regulates the various officials (primarily judges), which generates vast 
amounts of data and analytics at all levels. This data may span from the 
performance of the individual judge, through specific courts (or departments 
therein), to the judiciary as a whole. 
How was this system developed? What does the development process, led 
by the state, teach us about the relationship between law and technology more 
generally? And what impact, if any, did the development and implementation 
of Legal-Net have on judging? These questions are at the core of this Article. 
While considerable attention has been paid to the development of market-
based platforms,2 less is known on the development of bureaucratic platforms, 
namely platforms used by the government to manage its own processes. 
Similarly, while attention has been directed to the possible effect of data 
analytics and AI on judicial decision-making,3 much less is known about how 
certain court administrations use technology to manage the judicial process.4 
 
 1. As elaborated below, Legal-Net “manages” the Magistrate Court (sometimes referred to as “Courts 
of the Peace”) and District Courts in Israel—the two judicial instances that deal with the vast majority of court 
cases in Israel—civil, administrative, and criminal. However, Legal-Net was not implemented in Israel’s third-
tier, highest court, the Supreme Court, nor does it reach the religious courts and the quasi-judicial institutions 
in charge of the execution of judgments. For a description of the system, see infra note 26 and accompanying 
text. For a description of the system managing cases at the Supreme Court level, see infra notes 59–64 and 
accompanying text. 
 2. See Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133 (2017). 
 3. Daniel Ben-Ari, et al., Artificial Intelligence in the Practice of Law: An Analysis and Proof of 
Concept Experiment, 23 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2, 35 (2017) (“[W]e can predict that in the long run, AI 
technologies using machine learning and deep learning techniques may replace lawyers, arbitrators, mediators, 
and even judges.”). 
 4. By managing the judicial process, or “judicial management,” we mean the practices and tools 
available to administrators (who may, or may not, be judges), in charge of devising, implementing, and 
enforcing policies and decisions regarding the way the judiciary, a court, segment of a court or individual 
judges carry out their tasks, including the definition of these tasks, their allocation, and the assessment of the 
manner in which they were completed. This function is different from the classical judicial function of 
addressing cases, including judicial disposition thereof, on the merits. The term also refers to the management 
by a judge of his or her tasks (such as the tools and practices available to him or her), as well as to policies and 
decisions regarding the environment within which judges operate, their work conditions, facilities, benefits 
(excluding salary, which is set by constitutional and statutory norms), and auxiliary personnel. For more on 
judicial management and judicial administration, see THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGE FOR JUDICIAL SYSTEMS: 
DEVELOPING A PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PERSPECTIVE (Marco Fabri & Philip M. Langbroek eds., 2000); 
Michal Agmon-Gonen, Judicial Independence: The Threat from Within?, 18 HAMISHPAT 2, 11–12 (2004) 
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This is important to the extent the technology impacts judicial practices, and 
potentially even the judicial role, and thus carries normative implications.5 
Legal-Net itself, one of the first systems designed to govern all aspects of 
litigation, has attracted little scholarly attention thus far.6 The previously-
untold story surrounding the development and implementation of Legal-Net is 
particularly important in this context. It provides rare insights into the role of 
governments in developing managerial technologies and the transformation 
that technology-driven ecosystems may bring about within governmental 
organizations, including the judiciary. In this respect, this Article will show 
that Legal-Net ushered in a new era of judicial management (in terms of 
efficiency and modes of control), thereby raising separation of powers 
concerns. Additionally, it has conceivably transformed what judging is, at least 
as perceived from within the system. Whereas before judges viewed their task 
as primarily requiring the individualized application of a unique type of 
judicial wisdom (or art) honed over a lengthy legal career, Legal-Net is 
premised on a bureaucratic logic, which shapes the self-conception of judges 
as having a standardized role of processing disputes with an emphasis on 
keeping the production line running as smoothly as possible and thus requires a 
different set of skills and sensibilities. 
In analyzing the development, ascendance, and expansion of Legal-Net, 
we advance three main arguments. The first argument addresses the 
development process. Legal-Net in its current form cannot be understood if the 
rise and ultimate fall of the “grand-design” approach is ignored. This approach 
sought to harness technology to structure the entire domain of litigation, 
including fully digitizing courtrooms by establishing a paper-less court, nearly 
automated case-management tools, and an all-encompassing inventory 
analytics. The “grand design” attempt came to a screeching halt because it 
required too grand a technological leap at the time, even for the innovative 
 
(Heb.); J. Clifford Wallace, Judicial Administration in a System of Independents: A Tribe with Only Chiefs, 
1978 BYU L. REV. 39. 
 5 . See Charles W. Nihan & Russell R. Wheeler, Using Technology to Improve the Administration of 
Justice in the Federal Courts, 1981 BYU. L. REV. 659, 660 (“[T]echnological innovation will affect the 
judicial process.”); see also Casey R. Fronk, The Cost of Judicial Citation: An Empirical Investigation of 
Citation Practices in the Federal Appellate Courts, 2010 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 51, 60 (citing U.S. 
Federal Judicial Center Inquiry that found many federal judges embraced early computerized research 
programs, and also noting that one judge believed computers would “save precious professional time in the 
routine low-order search which finally uncovers the few pieces calling for close study and lawyer-like 
judgment.”); Shay Lavie, Appellate Courts and Caseload Pressure, 27 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 57, 87 (2016) 
(“[T]he Ninth Circuit seems to be more receptive toward implementing changes, particularly responses that 
appear to be relatively ‘neutral’—such as more judicial specialization, greater reliance on visiting judges and a 
more pervasive use of technology.”). As our research reveals, the Israeli judiciary, albeit consisting of some 
judicial entrepreneurs and embedded in the mentality of the Start-Up Nation, were less enthusiastic in adopting 
an all-encompassing technological platform. 
 6. For a notable exception, see Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Beyond Efficiency: The Transformation of 
Courts Through Technology, 12 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 16–32 (2008). Rabinovich-Eini refers to Legal-Net as 
a “NGCS—New Generation Court System.” Id. at 7. 
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Israeli high-tech sector.7 It also evoked resistance from a judiciary, weary of 
the hierarchical structuring of their judicial conduct. Yet, in hindsight this 
failure is an integral part of Legal-Net’s success. It forced the administration 
and its IT department to break down the ingredients that could and should be 
digitized and to prioritize development and implementation of the technology. 
It also forced the engagement of the judiciary and the administrative 
stakeholders in the design process, which helped secure buy-in and also 
bridged the legal-technological divide.8 The platform that was developed on 
the fragments (and ruins) of the “grand revolution” approach was no less 
revolutionary, but was (and still is) a product of a piece-meal process, which 
evolved with twists and turns; only the latest of which reinstituted the 
comprehensive nature of the system and its overarching control.  
The second argument addresses broader law-and-technology themes, 
related to the attitude towards technology by policymakers charged with 
judicial management. The incremental manner in which Legal-Net took shape 
allowed for the interlace of four different policy attitudes. Each attitude 
approached the law-and-technology interface differently. The first saw 
technology as a necessity. Policymakers turned to technology because there 
was simply no other choice, given the rising volume of cases and the mounting 
complexity of the judicial system.9 Under this approach, absent technological 
innovation, bureaucratic systems—the judiciary included—would run into an 
overload and experience a severe system slowdown, if not failure. The second 
treated technology as a strong regulatory tool with which agencies govern. 
Under this approach, technology is a command-and-control architecture, and 
therefore it should be designed—by building technological “do’s” and 
“don’ts,” walls and paths—to strictly channel the judicial process. The third 
attitude views technology as a regulatory tool, but one operating on a different 
plane: it is the heart of an ecosystem for synthesizing the needs and interests of 
the diverse stakeholders. According to this approach, IT platforms generate a 
sense of, and an actual realization of, “an organization” (or an agency or 
community). These platforms are enabling tools that not only improve 
communication, order interactions, and set out structure, but also offer a 
unifying collaborative-integrative domain that synchronizes and incorporates 
the needs of the various stakeholders. Having access to the platform, therefore, 
comes with an ecosystem of functions as well as professional identity and 
hierarchies, which become central to the operation of government. Under the 
 
 7. This point became particularly evident in the interviews we conducted with Yarden Yardeni, 
Information Technology and Services Consultant and Contractor—The Administration of Courts. Mr. Yardeni 
was a key member of the Legal-Net original design team; as a senior officeholder in the Administration’s IT 
department. He also played a significant role in the design of other, related technological endeavors, pursued 
by the Administration, such as “the E-filing court,” which will be discussed infra Subpart III.B.  
 8. See infra Subpart III.C. 
 9. See Orna Rabinovich-Einy & Ethan Katsh, The New New Courts, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 165, 185–86 
(2017) (arguing that many judicial technology efforts were “aimed at improving efficiency and dealing with 
budgetary constraints, rather than re-imagining the litigation process and the role of courts.”). 
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fourth approach, technology is embedded in, and therefore must reflect, a set of 
core values. Recognizing that technology is regulative in nature, the questions 
developers must, and in our context did, face are: which values to implement, 
how to reach an agreement over such values within the governmental agency, 
and then how to ensure that the values are appropriately integrated into the 
technological design and application. This approach—technology as a site of 
values—was of particular salience when the governmental agency facing IT 
design questions was an agency whose daily operation revolves around values, 
namely the judiciary.10 
The third argument, building upon the last point, addresses the impact 
Legal-Net had on judging. The management of judges—both system-wide and 
on an individual-judge level—raises obvious normative considerations (such as 
the tension between accountability and independence),11 which could not be 
assessed if the contemporary interface between technology and the judicial 
process is not considered. This Article reveals two such normative points. 
Firstly, and bluntly put, Legal-Net made judges substantially more transparent 
(to their seniors, but also to their peers) than in earlier days. It transformed the 
manner in which judges are monitored by presidents of courts, the Chief 
Justice, Ministry of Justice officials, and, above all, the Administration of 
Court (the “Administration”) and its head, the Director of Courts (the 
“Director”)12 who administer the production of justice in Israel.13 
Consequently, the manner in which a single judge conducts herself can be 
easily measured in comparison to her peers (in the same judicial instance or in 
other courts). Likewise, a section within a court, or a court in a certain 
location, can be comparatively analyzed in relation to its relevant 
counterparts.14 Such transparency may be regarded as laudable, as a 
component of ensuring that tenured judges provide quality service.15 But 
Legal-Net’s regulative power may certainly carry significant risks regarding 
the independence of the single judge (and aggregately, of judges) vis-à-vis her 
regulators, and indirectly, vis-à-vis other interested segments in and around the 
 
 10. See id. at 204 (recognizing that the introduction of algorithms into the judicial process raises 
questions about what judicial values these algorithms support); see also Lavie, supra note 5 (suggesting that, 
to the extent the technology is perceived as neutral, it may be more easily embraced). We show that, to the 
extent the managerial systems are comprehensive, they are inherently implicated with value judgment 
regarding their design and managerial assumptions, approach, and expected impact.  
 11. Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and Judicial 
Independence, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 103, 118 (2009) (addressing the relationship between judicial accountability 
and independence, as managed by the institution of judicial councils). 
 12. For an overview of the institutional matrix governing judicial management in Israel, see Guy Lurie, 
Amnon Reichman, & Yair Sagy, Agencification and the Administration of Courts in Israel, 14 REG. & 
GOVERNANCE (forthcoming 2020). 
 13. We elaborate further on this argument infra Part V. 
 14. See Telephone Interview with Yarden Yardeni, Information Technology and Services Consultant and 
Contractor, The Administration of Courts (July 1, 2014) [hereinafter Yardeni’s First Interview]. 
 15. See Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 6, at 4 (discussing the impact that novel technology had on Israeli 
courts’ productivity). Measuring the quality of the judicial service is, of course, no easy task. See 69 HOW TO 
MEASURE THE QUALITY OF JUDICIAL REASONING 2 (Mátyás Bencze & Gar Yein Ng eds., 2018). 
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court system, who may use the transparency to burn rather than cleanse the 
process.  
Secondly, the introduction of Legal-Net required approaching the judicial 
process as something that may be programmed, according to rules of civil and 
criminal procedure. Consequently, a particular kind of technology, with its 
language, manuals, and assessments protocols, was developed and 
implemented. The unintended consequence of this endeavor resulted in judges 
conceiving of their role as part of a production line, the function of which is to 
provide a certain kind of service, and less to be the traditional masters of 
justice in their courts, focused on resolving individual disputes and guiding 
behavior according to the laws. This transformation of the self-conception of 
judging carries potentially far-reaching implications, which may be deemed as 
revolutionary as the digital system that brought this transformation about. 
This argument about Legal-Net’s impact on judging points to new areas 
of inquiry in the broader research field of judicial behavior and motivation.16 
While other scholars have looked into the general question of how institutional 
design can affect both individual and system-wide judicial reputation,17 and 
some have examined the potential of implementing technological solutions to 
guide the process of decision-making,18 the specific question of how 
managerial technology affects judicial behavior is under-examined. This 
Article provides a possible starting point by laying out the potential connection 
between technology—the development process, the implementation process, 
and the product/platform itself—and the judicial mindset. The institutional 
design and technological ecosystem within which judges perform their role are 
important and should be further studied, as they shape the judicial environment 
 
 16. Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Things Everybody Else 
Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993). Posner’s influential essay “models the judicial utility function in terms 
that allows judges to be seen as ordinary people responding rationally to ordinary incentives.” Id. at 1. 
Research has shown that judges are motivated by a range of factors unrelated to the legal questions at issue. 
One of these factors is a desire for leisure time. See, e.g., Tom S. Clark et al., Estimating the Effect of Leisure 
on Judicial Performance, 47 J. LEGAL STUD. 349 (2018). A second factor revolves around re-election 
concerns, where applicable. Alma Cohen, Alon Klement & Zvika Neeman, Judicial Decision Making: A 
Dynamic Reputation Approach, 44. J. LEGAL STUD. S133 (2015). More broadly, research demonstrates that 
judges are prone to the same mental shortcuts as the general population, which often leads to legally irrelevant 
factors motivating decisions. For evidence that judges “[overweigh] the salient facts of the case,” see Pedro 
Bordalo et al., Salience Theory of Judicial Decisions, 44. J. LEGAL STUD. S7, S18 (2015). For evidence that 
sentencing decisions are affected by judges’ exposure (or lack thereof) to more serious crimes, see Adi 
Leibovitch, Punishing on a Curve, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1205 (2017). For evidence that the racial identity of 
lower court judges impacts appeal decisions, see Maya Sen, Is Justice Really Blind? Race and Reversal in U.S. 
Courts, 44. J. LEGAL STUD. S187 (2015). 
 17. Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Reputation, Information and the Organization of the Judiciary, 4 J. 
COMP. L. 228 (2009).  
 18. Outside the organizations and technology field, other scholars have identified low-technology 
mechanisms for improving the judicial decision-making process. See Zhuang Lui, Does Reason Writing 
Reduce Decision Bias? Experimental Evidence from Judges in China, 47 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 84 (2018) 
(finding that forcing judges to write down their reasoning prior to making their decision served as an effective 
“debiasing procedure”).  
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and are therefore relevant to understanding the different forms of judicial 
accountability.19 
The structure of the remainder of this Article will be as follows: we will 
first address some methodological concerns, given the novelty of the approach 
we undertook. We will then provide a description of Legal-Net, followed by a 
detailed account of the four above-mentioned approaches to the interaction 
between technology and the management of the production of justice, 
embedded in the development of the platform. We will then address the 
normative dimension of technology—notably, the transparent, all-observing 
features of the system. We will conclude with a tentative epilogue, regarding 
the state of Legal-Net today and, in particular, the ongoing struggle 
surrounding its implementation, as the system evolves to include data mining 
and analytics.  
I.  PRELIMINARY METHODOLOGICAL COMMENTS 
A. CASE STUDY  
Building on the taxonomy of Alexander George and Andrew Bennett,20 
this Article deploys the “disciplined configurative” approach—an interpretive 
method that uses theoretical frameworks to understand a discrete development 
in greater detail. More specifically, we deploy a combined historical analysis 
and interview methodology in order to unearth the development of Legal-Net. 
We then turn to law-and-technology frameworks in order to situate the 
development in a theoretical context, thereby shedding light on the meaning of 
the development as well as on the frameworks themselves. This 
methodological approach is useful—and necessary—when a novel research 
question arises and therefore the relevant literature has not yet identified the 
applicable variables for covering a larger set of cases. To date, we are not 
aware of similar examinations of the development of judicial management 
digital platforms.21 Focusing on a single case study thus assures that this novel 
endeavor is conducted in a rigorous manner, sensitive to the relevant nuances 
and cognizant of the complexities between the various pertinent factors—
complexities which may be lost if the research is expanded (and consequently 
simplified) to include other cases. A case study is an invitation not only for a 
critical evaluation of the findings with respect to the jurisdiction examined, but 
 
 19. For an overview of different mechanisms for judicial accountability, see Niel Chisholm, The Faces of 
Judicial Independence: Democratic Versus Bureaucratic Accountability in Judicial Selection, Training, and 
Promotion in South Korea and Taiwan, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 893 (2014).  
 20. ALEXANDER L. GEORGE & ANDREW BENNETT, CASE STUDIES AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
SOCIAL SCIENCES (2005). 
 21. Other authors have surveyed different technological capacities of different judicial systems through 
the lens of technological efficiency. See, e.g., Janet Walker & Garry D. Watson, New Trends in Procedural 
Law: New Technologies and the Civil Litigation Process, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 251, 253 
(2008). Our examination of Legal-Net provides a more critical analysis of how the quest for technological 
efficiency implicates other normative concerns with judicial management. 
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also for testing the applicability of the methods, the relevance of the findings, 
and the purchase of the variables in other jurisdictions. It is our hope that this 
study, and the novel application of this combined historical analysis and 
interview methodology, will set the grounds for future case studies that will 
further realize the full potential for a comparative analysis of the relationship 
between technological platforms designed to manage the provision of “judicial 
services” and the judicial function itself. 
B. WHY LEGAL-NET?  
Legal-Net was chosen as the case study for two main reasons. First, 
Legal-Net is one of the early, if the not the first, cloud-based comprehensive 
court administration platforms developed by a state. Surprisingly, it has not 
been fully studied before, despite the apparent importance for understanding 
the daily operation of the justice system. Second, the system’s structure (and 
modifications throughout the years) raise important questions regarding the 
relationship between law and technology in the context of managing judges, 
and regulation more generally. This case study therefore offers fertile grounds 
for examining the theoretical frameworks within which managerial technology 
is developed and understood. 
C. STRUCTURE OF RESEARCH 
Methodologically, the Article is based on the analysis of documents 
related to Legal-Net’s development process, as well as a series of interviews 
with the men and women who have been—and some of whom still are—
involved in the development of Legal-Net. The comprehensive interviews 
encompassed both managerial officials of various levels as well as members of 
the courts’ technological corpus. Specifically, between the years 2014 and 
2016, we conducted ten individual, semi-structured interviews with the 
following personas: Founding Director of the Israeli Courts Research Division; 
Former Head of the Israel Bar Association Computing Committee; Head of 
Administration of Courts Secretariats Division; Former Deputy Director of 
Courts Administration; Former Member of the Legal-Net Design Team; 
Information Technology and Services Consultant and Contractor—The 
Administration of Courts; and several former Directors of Courts who served 
in that capacity over different periods of times.22 This Article analyzes the 
interviewees’ responses with regard to the design and implementation of 
Legal-Net, so as to construct a historical account of the system’s development, 
 
 22. Interview with Keren Weinshall-Margel, Founding Dir., Isr. Courts Research Div. Ctr. at Israel 
Supreme Court, in Jerusalem, Isr. (June 1, 2014); Interview with Haim Ravia, Former Head of the Isr. Bar 
Ass’n Computing Comm., in Herzliya, Isr. (April 7, 2014); Interview with Shlomit Levy, Head of Admin. of 
Courts Secretariats Div., in Jerusalem, Isr. (May 2, 2016); Interview with Zion Caspi, Former Deputy Dir. of 
Courts Admin., in Beit Nekofa, Isr. (Mar. 26, 2014); Interview with Haim Gonen, Former Member of the 
Legal-Net Design Team, in Tel Aviv, Isr. (May 18, 2014); Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14; Interviews 
with Several Former Dirs. of Courts (different years), see infra notes 33, 47, 66, & 67. 
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having in mind insights from law-and-technology literature regarding ways to 
conceptualize the role of technology in judicial management. This endeavor is 
distinct from neighboring interests in the use of technology for adjudication 
(for example, for prediction of legal outcomes of particular judges)23 or for 
assisting judges in decision-making (such as developing AI technologies).24 In 
that respect, the focus of this study is novel. However, as we will show, some 
of the concerns raised by judicial management platforms correspond with 
concerns regarding litigation-related technologies. 
II.  WHAT IS LEGAL-NET? 
Legal-Net is a cloud-based platform that handles the administration of all 
first-instance and appellate court cases litigated in the Magistrate and District 
courts in Israel, save for Supreme Court cases.25 It serves as a unified calendar 
and time planner for these courts in their entirety. All court appointments, 
hearings, and courtroom assignments are scheduled via Legal-Net. The system 
also manages the judicial “warehouse” by tracking down all cases in the 
system, classifying them according to several categories, and indicating the 
stage they are at and the next action each file awaits.26  
Legal-Net serves as the working station for judges. It is the site where all 
court documents are filed (for example, transcripts of arguments in courts, 
testimonies and cross-examinations) and where there is an official record of the 
summoned witnesses, including the date they are expected to appear in court 
and any details regarding their testimony. It is where judges’ drafts are 
composed, and ultimately where the decisions on the various motions as well 
as final resolutions are written, published, and stored. Judges are not 
authorized to write something on their own computers; they are instructed to 
work on Legal-Net. The platform also serves as a communication system for 
lawyers and parties at large: therein they submit most legal documents, 
including motions, affidavits, exhibits, briefs, replies, requests for summoning 
a witness, and statement of appeals, to name a few. It is also where they 
subsequently receive judicial input, including all decisions.  
 
 23. John O. McGinnis & Russell G. Pearce, The Great Disruption: How Machine Intelligence Will 
Transform the Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of Legal Services, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041, 3052 (2014).  
 24. For an early discussion, see Robert J. Spagnoletti, Using Artificial Intelligence to Aid in the 
Resolution of Socioscientific Disputes: A Theory for the Next Generation, 2 J.L. & TECH. 101 (1987); see also 
Pamela S. Katz, Expert Robot: Using Artificial Intelligence to Assist Judges in Admitting Scientific Expert 
Testimony, 24 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 26–44 (2014); William M. Landes et al., Judicial Influence: A 
Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 275 (1998); Lyria Bennett 
Moses & Janet Chan, Using Big Data for Legal and Law Enforcement Decisions: Testing the New Tools, 37 
U.N.S.W. L.J. 643, 644 (2014); Theodore W. Ruger et al., Essay, The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: 
Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 
1150, 1152 (2004). 
 25. Generally, the system operates in a Microsoft environment and looks similar, if not identical, to other 
Microsoft users’ desktop. 
 26. Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22; Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14. At that time 
period, Levy and Yardeni were already employees of The Administration of Courts. 
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Legal-Net has evidently transformed the manners in which judges 
conduct their judicial duties. To illustrate, when a judge visits her Legal-Net 
portal, she has instant access to her task-assignment log and is notified of the 
tasks awaiting her attention.27 Furthermore, the judge can see her colleagues’ 
and other courts’ workloads and evolution of cases.28 More specifically, she 
can see which cases are pending, and at what stage. As a communication 
system, a large part of the judge’s interaction with the rest of the judiciary is 
mediated through Legal-Net. Thus, for example, a judge is notified by the 
system when a decision she has made is appealed and when that appeal is 
resolved. The judge can monitor the appeal and its different stages by herself 
through Legal-Net.29 Also, a judge may easily communicate with other judges 
or officials, using the system’s interface, and exchange messages, set meetings, 
or work jointly on a judgment when sitting in panels.30 Legal-Net also serves 
as a portal for core legal services—primarily as an access point to commercial 
online legal databases. Moreover, it serves itself as a database, as it stores all 
documents in a searchable and retrievable format.  
Since data is updated in real time, Legal-Net functions as a powerful 
statistical platform capable of producing comprehensive and contemporary 
reports in response to queries by authorized personnel. From a managerial 
perspective the entire information and data stored by Legal-Net is visible to the 
heads of the judiciary. Legal-Net allows them to have credible information on 
the performance of individual judges or a given court, as well as the entire 
judiciary’s caseload (provided, of course, that the data was entered correctly by 
the registrars’ officers).31 For example, the system may analyze the synchronic 
or diachronic caseload of individual judges, sections within courts, a single 
court, or any court, and compare that section to others. It may offer 
information about judicial time each legal motion consumed, or run statistical 
analysis on the average (median, or any other denominator) time it takes 
certain judicial entities to address certain decisions, rates of granting or 
rejecting certain motions (per judge or per court), or any other data-based 
query.32  
Legal-Net caters not only to the needs of judges, or the judicial 
administration, but also to those of the legal profession as a whole.33 Attorneys 
may log into Legal-Net’s website, at their convenience and wherever they may 
 
 27. Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14. 
 28. Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22; Telephone Interview with Yarden Yardeni, Info. Tech. 
and Servs. Consultant and Contractor, The Admin. of Courts (Nov. 15, 2016) [hereinafter Yardeni’s Telephone 
Interview]. 
 29. Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14. 
 30. Interview with Yarden Yardeni, Info. Tech. and Servs. Consultant and Contractor, The Admin. of 
Courts, in Caesarea, Isr. (July 21, 2014) [hereinafter Yardeni’s Second Interview]. 
 31. Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22; Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14. 
 32. Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30.  
 33. Interview with Judge Boaz Okon, Former Dir. of Courts, in Tel-Aviv, Isr. (April 27, 2015); 
Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30. 
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be, using a “smart card” and a password. Once logged in, they may follow the 
progression of their cases, submit documents/motions, pay court fees, review 
future court dates, examine the history of past cases, review the court’s log, 
and so on. A lawyer can see her firm’s pending cases with the click of a button. 
She can also find out the status of a case, request rescheduling, and correspond 
with other parties. As part of managing the adversarial process, Legal-Net is 
configured to send out court documents and documents submitted to courts by 
one side to other parties to the case. Attorneys are regularly notified by Legal-
Net upon the submission of a new document, at which point a link is sent to 
them. Each side can see if the other opened the link and viewed the file. 
Lawyers may download materials from the court’s files for their own use. 
Technically, the system logs all such interactions. 
As of 2017, there were approximately 3900 registered internal users (such 
as judiciary-officials and judges), of which, on average, 2700 enter the system 
on a daily basis.34 As for external users, there were 14,000 law offices 
connected to Legal-Net with the above-mentioned “smart cards.”35 
Approximately 75% of requests filed to courts by attorneys and 50% of all 
submissions of materials to courts were done by remote electronic filing via 
Legal-Net.36 These figures bear testament to the sea change in the production 
of justice in Israel brought about by Legal-Net.37 
We are unaware of any other judicial technology platform that integrates 
so many different functions throughout the judiciary. Legal-Net controls the 
submission, scheduling, and opinion-writing process across the entire Israeli 
judicial system (with the exception of the Supreme Court). As one point of 
comparison, the U.S. federal court system lacks a centralized technology 
platform responsible for such a range of judicial management functions.38 
Although the U.S. federal judiciary is developing a case management system 
called Next Generation that integrates more judicial functions than did 
previous technology frameworks,39 a variety of technological and institutional 
design factors will prevent any single technology system from controlling as 
much of the judicial process in the United States as Legal-Net does in Israel. A 
single technology platform as powerful as Legal-Net in the American federal 
system would undermine a long tradition of allowing different federal court 
systems to set their own administrative policies and rules, as well as their own 
 
 34. Yardeni’s Telephone Interview, supra note 28. 
 35. Id. 
 36. It is actually more common for small firms to submit documents to courts’ secretariats solely via 
Legal-Net, rather than manually. Id.  
 37. Id. 
 38. The current Strategic Plan for the United States Federal Judiciary acknowledges both centralized and 
diffuse components of court technology platforms. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 
STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2015). 
 39. Id.; see also John Brinkema & J. Michael Greenwood, E-Filing Case Management Services in the 
U.S. Federal Courts: The Next Generation: A Case Study, 7 INTL. J. FOR CT. ADMIN. 3 (2015). 
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pace of technological change.40 Even California, home to so many innovative 
technology companies, lacks a single technology platform that so efficiently 
incorporates different components of the judicial process.41 
Needless to say, given the technological complexity of Legal-Net, the 
system is not bug-free, and it has even been hacked at least once.42 Yet, it is 
difficult to ignore its omnipresence and its comprehensive ability to channel 
and govern the business of courts in Israel. 
III.  HOW DID LEGAL-NET COME TO BE? A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF ITS HISTORY & 
FOUR APPROACHES TO TECHNOLOGY 
We turn now to sketch the historical evolution of the system, which—as 
noted—has not been told in detail as of yet. The description that we put 
forward is interpretative and dialectic to a considerable extent. Although there 
is no evidence supporting the conclusion that the design of Legal-Net followed 
an ex-ante unitary, overarching blueprint, in hindsight—ex-post—we can 
detect four distinct principal policy approaches underlying its emergent design. 
Hence, on the one hand, we will show that the design process and evolution of 
Legal-Net has not followed a grand plan, but rather it has proceeded from one 
semi-improvised solution to another. But, on the other hand, we will illustrate 
how an ex-post analysis of the path leading to the shape Legal-Net has 
eventually taken reveals a progression from one approach to technology to 
another. To emphasize, this shift in approaches or attitudes was not pre-
planned, nor was it necessarily fully articulated as such by the players at the 
time. Rather, this progression is revealed by interpreting, in retrospect, the shift 
in identifying the problem (the solution of which technology was developed to 
solve), the steps needed to be taken in order to develop and harness 
technology, and the intended impact of the technological solutions. As we will 
show, such approaches or attitudes have their own internal logic and set of 
(usually unstated) assumptions; they also carry unintended consequences (as 
would any regulatory approach).43  
 
 40. Telephone Interview with Retired Judge Jeremy Fogel, Exec. Dir., Berkeley Judicial Inst. (May 2, 
2019). Judge Fogel explained that U.S. judges are embracing many technological improvements, while also 
protecting the values of local court discretion and autonomy in setting certain technology policies. Id. Judge 
Fogel also said that cybersecurity is one area in which there is more of an emphasis on nationwide best 
practices, since any local vulnerabilities could have national effects. Id. 
 41. California’s many different state courts have different technology systems, and in fact some still use 
paper systems. CAROL A. CORRIGAN & WILLIAM R. MCGUINNESS, COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF CALIFORNIA’S 
COURT SYS., REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE 214 (2017).  
 42. Eli Senyor & Maor Buchnik, Default: Hacker Broke into Israeli Courts System, CALCALIST (Sept. 
10, 2012), https://www.calcalist.co.il/internet/articles/0,7340,L-3582640,00.html (Heb.). 
 43. See EDWARD TENNER, WHY THINGS BITE BACK: TECHNOLOGY AND THE REVENGE OF UNINTENDED 
CONSEQUENCES (1997); Wanda J. Orlikowski, The Duality of Technology: Rethinking the Concept of 
Technology in Organizations, 3 ORG. SCI. 398 (1992) (addressing some unintended consequences generated by 
action and organizational politics in relation to technology); Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and 
Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1390 (1994) (addressing the unintended consequences or 
campaign finance regulation).   
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The following subsections will show that, in the course of its 
development, Legal-Net was made to address first administrative, later 
structural, then managerial, and finally normative (value-laden) challenges 
beleaguering the Israeli judiciary. By an “administrative” challenge, we mean 
the bureaucratic, functional task of processing masses of cases, which 
technology was harnessed to tackle. Under this approach, technology was 
conceived as neutral in terms of values, ideology or power, and its 
development conceptualized as a mere response to sub-optimal 
administration.44 In the face of severe functional problems concerning case 
backlogs and unequal distribution of cases, the remedy could have ostensibly 
been limited to creating computerized case-inventories, along with enabling 
judges to modernize their own work-environment by advancing their use of 
computerized word-processing systems, digitized calendar, and access to 
online commercial databases.45 
The second approach—which we term the structural approach—took a 
much more ambitious stand toward technology and the challenges facing the 
judiciary. Under this approach, the challenges also included the aspiration to 
structure, rather rigidly, judicial performance, in the belief that judges needed 
to be more rigorously managed. Therefore, technology should encompass the 
entire relevant domain or activity under regulation and should incorporate 
command-and-control rules of “do’s” and “don’t’s.” In the Israeli case, the 
technology was introduced not merely to assist but to structure the 
transformation of the court system.46 As infrastructure for the regulation of 
justices, the novel technology could not merely take the form of an Outlook 
software, a Microsoft Windows operating systems with a Microsoft Office 
suite, or some sort of a “Lotus for Organizations.”47 Rather, technology needed 
to place hard limits on judicial sub-optimal (or perhaps evasive) maneuvers, 
while providing an innovative, exciting platform for progress to a brighter 
future premised on a fully digitized judicial process. On this approach, 
administration officials seemed to regard novel technologies as a panacea to a 
great many, if not all, of the ailments afflicting the Israeli judiciary, 
optimistically discounting the limitations of contemporaneous technologies. 
A third, more nuanced approach, viewed technology as a solution to a 
limited set of managerial problems centered on coordination and integration. 
This latter approach focused, more modestly, on the need to coordinate among 
the innumerable dynamic parts of the judicial process. Under this approach, 
technology is taken as a collaborative process; it is a space within which a 
community of users is generated, integrated, and sustained. It is an 
 
 44. Interview with Zion Caspi, supra note 22; Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22; Yardeni’s 
First Interview, supra note 14. 
 45. Interview with Zion Caspi, supra note 22; Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14. 
 46. Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14. 
 47. Interview with Judge Dan Arbel, Former Deputy Dir. and Dir. of Courts, in Qiryat Ono, Isr. (Feb. 3, 
2014). 
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environment within which governmental identity is shaped and interaction with 
the (private) profession is managed. Here, the appeal of technology stemmed 
from the realization that the judiciary was facing not only internal 
housekeeping difficulties or judicial regulation problems but also, if not 
mainly, a challenge of synchronization (or lack thereof), and of integrating into 
a workable whole the needs of the various sub-components and clients. 
Technology was expected to provide a platform for joint action and a sense of 
a unitary organization.48 
The fourth approach to technology as a tool for judicial governance 
revisited the apparent need for judicial processes to be structured, but from a 
different perception of what “structure” is and what role technology ought to 
play in such structure. Its starting point was unabashedly normative. It saw the 
technology of Legal-Net as a tool to reflect, or even to project, a commitment 
to implement and enhance a list of familiar liberal-democratic values, such as 
transparency and access to justice.49 Legal-Net was seen as a value-enhancing 
technological platform. Importantly, not only was the normative overtone of 
this approach unique, but also the style of regulation it espoused. It saw 
technology as regulating the system primarily via information—the very 
knowledge Legal-Net produced—rather than by hard and fast rules in the style 
of command-and-control regulation. 
With this brief synopsis in mind, we turn to a more detailed analysis of 
the four approaches and the annals of the development of Legal-Net. 
A. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
Our journey begins in the early 1990s, when the Israeli judicial system 
was facing considerable managerial challenges, attributable to the rise in 
backlog and failing management and technological infrastructures.50 Amazing 
as it may sound, so dire was the judiciary’s technological state at that point that 
the Administration of Courts was lost in the dark when it came to the most 
basic of details: it lacked a sufficiently credible estimation of the number of 
 
 48. It has been suggested that technology is not a tool, but a reflection of a sought-after structure: 
“[S]ociological approaches tend to emphasize either the potential of human agency in addressing the 
implications of technological development or the structural dominance of technological systems and 
logic. . . . [T]he technology is either the logic of the structure or a reflection of a newly formed structure.” See 
Arthur Cockfield & Jason Pridmore, A Synthetic Theory of Law and Technology, 8 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 
475, 478 (2007). 
 49. The fourth approach is also acknowledged by Cockfield & Pridmore, supra note 48, at 480. (“[Some 
believe that] technology is completely neutral, solely serving the intended purposes held for it by its 
users. . . . [However, even under this approach,] human beings can and do direct the use of technology.”). 
Thus viewed, the technology of Legal-Net can certainly be used to achieve the normative goals envisaged by 
this approach. 
 50. See Dan Arbel, בושחימ ה האמב טפשמה יתב-21  [Courts Computation in the 21st Century], 29 JUD. SYS. J. 
13 (1999) (Heb.); see also Meir Shamgar,יטפשמ עדימ רוזחיאו יטפשמ בושחימ ל הדעווה [The Committee for Judicial 
Computation and Restoration of Legal Information], 11 JUD. SYS. J. 13, 17–18 (1987) (detailing the 
introduction of the Committee for Judicial Computation and Restoration of Legal Information in 1987). 
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legal proceedings handled by the Israeli courts.51 Back then, the system relied 
on two sources: one was handwritten logs, kept in each of the courts’ 
secretariat, listing the cases opened, motions submitted, and cases closed. 
These ledgers, sometimes written in pencil to allow corrections, were the 
backbone of the system. The second source was the Mainframe—a computer 
that stored entries regarding opening and closing of cases (with general 
reference to their nature, such as criminal or civil). The data was entered 
manually at intervals, and output could be printed from the Mainframe itself.52  
In the mid-1990s, administration officials took an initial step to 
modernize judicial management by embarking on a preliminary computation of 
courts’ secretariats with the introduction of Mainframe programs (beyond the 
basic software already in use).53 These applications enabled the courts’ 
secretariats to provide the Administration with some elementary information at 
intervals. Retrieving (and printing) this information required the suspension of 
data input until the retrieval software was executed and the output was printed, 
and therefore prior coordination was necessary. However, the Mainframe 
software was inappropriate for the tasks at hand. For example, it did not track 
the physical location of a file or the stage a proceeding reached. While it was 
possible to know if court hearings began or ended (and with what result), there 
was no way to track the various motions within cases, nor to ascertain whether 
cases were dormant or not (and why).54  
Particularly troubling was the fact that under the 1990s framework, there 
was no central database or data clearinghouse through which to monitor, let 
alone to control, the flow of cases in the organization beyond entry and exit. 
The data was not uploaded to the Mainframe in real time, nor was there an 
option to retrieve the information in real time from the various courts. 
Moreover, there was no way to assess accurately the complexity of the 
litigation: the time certain cases consumed, the ratio of motions per judge, 
junctures where cases were likely to hit bottlenecks, and so on. Consequently, 
it was impossible to design intelligent scheduling modalities and, more 
specifically, it was difficult to predict how long conducting evidentiary 
hearings would last in each case. Under such conditions, judges’ performance 
could not be credibly systematized and streamlined.55  
While the judiciary was plagued by aging infrastructure, law offices were 
experimenting with novel technologies. Any contemporaneously appointed 
 
 51. Hadas Magen,  ינש לש םתרשמםינודאלברא ןד טפושה ,טפשמה יתב להנמ םע השירפ ןויאר .  [The Servant of Two 
Masters. Retirement Interview with Chief Justice, Dan Arbel], GLOBES (May 30, 2004), 
http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=800528 (Heb.). 
 52. Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22; Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14.   
 53. Interview with Zion Caspi, supra note 22. Mainframe is an operating system, that is, a collection of 
programs that manages a computer system’s internal workings: its memory, processors, devices, and file 
system. Id. Mainframe operating systems are commonly used in large organizations. Id.; see also Rabinovich-
Einy, supra note 6, at 16–17. 
 54. Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22; Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14. 
 55. Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14.   
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judge from the private sector would experience a technological step back upon 
using court technology, as courts lacked the ability to access the fast-emerging 
commercial legal databases, use networked word-processing systems, or 
otherwise communicate with the parties.56 Judges expressed frustration with 
the functionality of court technology.57  
Generally, at the time, courts’ reactions to the mounting technological 
challenge were local. Various presidents (or vice presidents) of courts 
confronted technological problems as they emerged in their own jurisdiction. 
For instance, in Tel Aviv, a local system, based on rather simple tools, was 
developed to address the issue of case allocation (we shall return to this 
system, called “Clouds,” in the following Section).58  
Similarly, at the Supreme Court, an independent computerized database 
was created in 2000.59 It allowed the Chief Justice to credibly ascertain, for the 
first time, the number of cases filed in a certain timeframe, the number of cases 
concluded, and the number of cases pending a decision.60 The Supreme Court’s 
database enabled the Chief Justice at the time, Aharon Barak, to acquire 
trustworthy information regarding the Court’s caseload, distribution of cases, 
and additional administrative specifications.61 The novel database featured 
“court log” software,62 which allocated cases among the justices and provided 
a credible inventory of Supreme Court cases.63 The log made it possible to 
carry out basic statistical analysis. As the Supreme Court log was installed, 
Chief Justice Barak noted that, until that point in time, the Court had only a 
rudimentary system lacking a center; only now, said Barak, did it have a 
heart.64  
Other courts tried to improve their reliance on the Mainframe software. 
Some courts attempted to introduce a tool to enable access to the Mainframe 
from the court halls, thereby allowing the Administration of Courts a better 
sense of the day-to-day operation of courts. The idea was to enable 
administrative personnel to update the Mainframe from the halls themselves, 
close to real time. Additionally, as part of this development, direct lines of 
 
 56. See Nihan & Wheeler, supra note 5, at 664 (“Judges, and by acculturation their administrative staffs, 
tend to give great weight to time-blessed administrative methods.”).  
 57. Interview with Zion Caspi, supra note 22; Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30. It is evident 
that the judges’ frustration fueled the need for technological advancements.  
 58. Interview with Dan Arbel, supra note 47; Interview with Zion Caspi’s, supra note 22; Yardeni’s First 
Interview, supra note 14. Arbel’s interest in technology was widely known amongst his colleagues. 
 59. It was a Structured Query Language (SQL) database. The creation of the database and its 
management were attributed to Judge Okon. See Yardeni’s Telephone Interview, supra note 28.  
 60. Interview with Zion Caspi, supra note 22; Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30; Interview with 
Haim Gonen, supra note 22.  
 61. Interview with Dan Arbel, supra note 47; Interview with Zion Caspi, supra note 22; see also infra 
notes 128–135 and accompanying text. For more on Barak’s support of the computation process, see infra 
Subpart III.D. 
 62. The “Court log” was also SQL-based, and it is still in use today. See supra note 59. Since first built, it 
has been operated by the “Magic” application generator. Yardeni’s Telephone Interview, supra note 28. 
 63. Interview with Haim Gonen, supra note 22. 
 64. Interview with Boaz Okon, supra note 33. 
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electronic communication were finally formed between courts’ secretariats and 
court halls.65 
Important as these attempts were, they were eclectic. Moreover, 
responses relying on the Mainframe were precarious, as the Mainframe 
suffered from several shortcomings. First, short of a full re-wiring and an 
upgrade of the communication networks, the disconnect between courtrooms 
and the secretariats in the numerous courts was endemic and debilitating. 
Second, the Mainframe did not support new commercial legal databases that 
were created at that time, which led to pressure from judges—eager to make 
use of these databases—to upgrade the technological infrastructure. Third, the 
Mainframe could provide only basic information (for example, it basically 
logged only the initial filing and termination dates). Fourth, and most 
devastatingly, the Mainframe began to crash regularly. Hardware and software 
were outdated and had to be upgraded or replaced. Our interviews reveal that 
in the late 1990s, the Administration’s IT team came to work each morning 
hoping the system would survive the day. As noted, in the mid-1990s the 
backlog in cases increased at an alarming rate,66 and all agreed a swift response 
was needed. The lack of credible data was seen as a major hurdle. 
Faced with such informational deficiencies, the judiciary’s top officials 
embarked, at the end of the 20th century, on a few technological initiatives in 
the hope of paving the road to proper management of the court system.67 As 
part of the overall endeavor to address both issues—the need to network the 
system and the necessity to better manage the case flow within the system—
the recently appointed Director of the Court Administration, Judge Arbel,68 
 
 65. The Mainframe was originally located in the IBM building in Tel-Aviv, and not in a court or the 
Administration’s building. Interview with Haim Gonen, supra note 22. The standalone computers could not 
communicate with computers in other courtrooms, judges’ chambers, or secretariats. Connecting courtrooms to 
the secretariats allowed for acquiring basic information regarding, for example, dates for particular procedures. 
The information that could be shared was still basic. For example, as it was not clear from the Mainframe 
whether parties received documents from the courts. Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22. There was 
an attempt to use the Mainframe also to assign case numbering. This function was traditionally handled 
manually by the different secretariats. The handwritten master log was the only source with which one could 
match a certain case number to the rest of the information about the case. 
 66. According to Arbel, during Ravivi’s term, the overall caseload of the Israeli judiciary was 1,200,000 
cases that were handled by 400 judges. Interview with Dan Arbel, supra note 47; Interview with Moshe Gal, 
Former Dir. of Courts, in Tel Aviv, Isr. (Feb. 24, 2016). For an explanation of the possible reasons for the 
increase in litigation, see infra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 67. Those initial steps were taken under the guidance of Director Ravivi (1994–1998) and his successor, 
Judge Dan Arbel (1998–2002). As part of the effort to modernize the judiciary’s technological infrastructure, a 
group of Israeli judges took part in a fourteen-day seminar in the Institute for the Study and Development of 
the Legal System in San Francisco in March 2000. The seminar was also attended by several American judges. 
See Letter from the Chamber of Aharon Barak, Chief Justice, to Judges Who Took Part in the S.F. Seminar, 
(Jan. 11, 2000) (on file with author); see also Interview with Dan Arbel, supra note 47; Interview with Zion 
Caspi, supra note 22. Israeli delegations also visited Singapore, where “E-filing” and “Paperless” Courts had 
already been introduced. Interview with Judge Yitzhak Ravivi, Former Director of Courts, in Herzliya, Isr. 
(Feb. 3, 2014). 
 68. Prior to his appointment, Judge Arbel was the President of the magistrate courts in Tel Aviv and The 
Center, and prior to that he served as the deputy to Judge Ravivi who was, at the time, the president of these 
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introduced the Israeli Courtrooms Management System (CMS), which was 
designed to provide a better assessment of the judicial workload.69  
The CMS made computerized legal databases available to judges not only 
while sitting in courtrooms (and using the standalone computer placed therein) 
but also while working in chambers.70 The basic idea was to end the use of 
standalone computers and connect the separate courtrooms to one another, as 
well as the courtrooms to the court secretariats. Additionally, the CMS took the 
assemblage of information regarding judges’ and courts’ performance to a new 
level: it could indicate how many cases were pending in each court, to whom 
each case was assigned within each court, and the status thereof. For the first 
time in the history of the Israeli judiciary, the system’s chiefs—primarily the 
Chief Justice and the Director of Courts—could obtain a somewhat realistic 
understanding of the different courts’ caseloads.  
But it was clear from the outset that there was only so much CMS could 
achieve, even once it was fully implemented in the numerous courts. It was 
essentially a patch, put in place to meet needs unmet by the Mainframe by 
connecting courts’ computers to each other. Thus, expectedly, as the system 
was developed and implemented, the CMS technological infrastructure began 
to malfunction as well. By 1998 it became clear that a major overhaul was 
required, and that a new technology must be installed.71 
But before we turn to the response of the system to this sense of 
impending crisis, we must note that the short-lived CMS had an unintended 
impact: it alerted judges to the relationship between “housekeeping” 
technologies, the regulation of the judicial functions and, ultimately, judicial 
behavior. While CMS addressed obvious administrative needs—such as the 
need to connect courtrooms to registrar offices, and chambers to courtrooms, 
as well as to connect them all to the commercial legal databases—it was also 
about using technology to generate credible statistical knowledge about 
caseloads and backlogs. While the old Mainframe provided basic data, CMS 
was designed to improve that dimension under the premise that technology 
should be harnessed to better manage the judicial process by generating 
 
courts. See Interview with Dan Arbel, supra note 47. In those capacities, Arbel worked toward local solutions, 
primarily based on seeking ways to network local courts. Id. It was based on this experience that upon 
appointment to the position of Director, Arbel sought to network the judicial system, building upon Windows’ 
capabilities. Id. 
 69. At the same time, Professor Niv Ahituv of the Tel-Aviv University School of Management devised a 
“strategic plan for information systems and computation of the courts.” The “Ahituv Report,” submitted in 
November 1996, advocated key elements of E-filing with a view to reducing the number of paper court files, 
increasing storage space within the courts, preventing file disappearance, and reducing attorneys’ visits to the 
courts. Additionally, the computation of courts secretariats also advanced the abovementioned computation of 
the Supreme Court. See Interview with Dan Arbel, supra note 47; Interview with Haim Gonen, supra note 22. 
 70. These actions had great practical significance as they allowed, for example, for the convenient 
altering of courtrooms during a trial, an option that hardly existed prior. But still, it remained only on the local 
computer network level. See Interview with Zion Caspi, supra note 22; Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 
14. 
 71. See Interview with Zion Caspi, supra note 22; Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14. 
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reliable data in real time, including data regarding the productivity of each 
judge.72 
In fact, it did not take much for the judges themselves to become aware of 
the importance of the short episode of the CMS. They were quick to realize its 
novel managerial dimension as soon as it became known that the CMS 
generated relatively detailed monthly reports regarding their productivity. Not 
long thereafter, judges gathered that their distinct performance could be—and, 
in fact, was being—monitored by the heads of the judicial system.73 
Furthermore, it became evident to judges that the reports’ findings had 
consequences. Notably, judges with weak performance reports were 
summoned to Chief Justice Barak and the Director of Courts.74 Although the 
content of such meetings was not made public, it seems reasonable to assume 
that judges perceived these meetings, which were prompted by negative 
performance reports, as indicating the advent of a new, higher level of 
accountability over the judiciary. The publication of the report generated some 
resentment, and a number of judges even expressed their bitter sentiments75 in 
tandem with their objection to other managerial reforms that they saw as 
limiting their own control over the judicial process.76 As we shall see next, 
however, for others this backlash indicated that something must be done in 
order to reign in inefficient judges whose performance was held to be out of 
line. 
B. THE STRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVE 
After it became evident that a technological overhaul was required, two 
interrelated questions had to be answered. The first was about the “how”: was 
 
 72. See Nihan & Wheeler, supra note 5, at 661 (“[T]echnology can improve the organization’s—in this 
case, the court’s —ability to collect and analyze data, thus enhancing efficiency.”). 
 73. For a sequential approach, which suggests that different ways of managing and monitoring judges 
pose a threat to the judicial system, see Frank M. Coffin, Grace Under Pressure: A Call for Judicial Self Help, 
50 OHIO ST. L.J. 399, 402 (1989) (“Judges are presently beset by pressures to subject other judges to sanctions 
for substandard conduct, to seek more professional management by judicial technocrats . . . . The ascendance 
of the management-governance function, whether by collegial group, technocrat, or committee, poses, if 
untouched, an insidious threat to the judicial functioning of the judiciary.”). 
 74. As the person who was in charge, Caspi was aware of the influence that the reports had on Judges. 
Caspi’s interview, supra note 44. 
 75. See Interview with Zion Caspi, supra note 22. 
 76. Judges resented also Director Arbel’s initiative to institute “the Focal Judge” Program, according to 
which cases would be first dealt by a Focal Judge who was able to discern the focus of the case, ascertain the 
scope and nature of the dispute, decide whether case could be settled, or whether it should be directed to 
further litigation. It was argued that the split between a Focal Judge and the judge, responsible for disposing of 
the case, only duplicated judicial procedures. Indeed, today the idea of Focal Judge is hardly used in courts 
beyond the criminal process. On Focal Judges, see Kenneth Mann,  אווש תואשרה תןועיט ירדסה :ילהנמ ילילפ ןיד רדס
 יטופיש חוקיפו םימשא לש [Administrative Criminal Procedure: Plea Agreements, False Convictions of Guilty 
Defendants and Judicial Review], in  םירגתאו תויעב – לארשיב םיילילפ ןיד ירדסו ילילפ קוח ?תיטפשמה תכרעמב קדצ 
[CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN ISRAEL—PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES] 229, 245–46 (Alon 
Harel ed., 2017) (Heb.); see also THE PUBLIC DEFENSE OFFICE, 2014 נשל יתנש חוד [ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2014] 
(2015) (Heb.); Interview with Dan Arbel, supra note 47.   
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the project at issue to be carried out by the organs of the State? Or, rather, 
should the Administration of Courts turn to the private market in search of 
technological solutions? Should the Administration just resign itself to 
solutions that can be bought off the shelf? The second question was more 
fundamental, focusing on the purpose: what should be the primary underlying 
demands to which the new technology should respond—administrative and 
productivity-oriented, or structural and regulative? More specifically, the 
search for purpose required addressing the policy that should undergird the 
necessary technological transformation—should it be the administrative 
outlook seeking to enhance productivity by putting in place networked 
scheduling and inventory technologies as the be all and end all of the system? 
Or should the technology be designed to address other concerns of the system 
as well, beyond warehousing, scheduling, and productivity tools? Under the 
former approach, it was better to focus on one aspect of the system and adopt a 
purely administrative look geared towards efficiency. Under the latter, it was 
better to adopt a more holistic approach and address productivity among other 
goals (such as fair distribution of cases within the system). The latter approach 
also suggested that technology and its development process may be used not 
only as a mean to achieve predetermined goals but also as a tool for devising 
and prioritizing the goals themselves.77  
It was Judge Arbel, the Director of Courts and an avid aficionado of 
technology (with a background in tech support), who seized the opportunity. 
He sought not only to technologically innovate the system but also to “think 
big” by digitizing the entire structure, thereby harnessing technology to 
regulate judges. It was also clear to him that the state should play a leading role 
in custom-designing the system.  
Recall that complaints about judicial backlog were mounting.78 The 
judge-to-case ratio plummeted and, equally importantly, the relative 
 
 77. See Cockfield & Pridmore, supra note 48, at 497 (suggesting that technology can do both, “the dicta 
that ‘code is law’ represents such an explicit attempt to see how a certain form of technology—the software 
and hardware technologies that enable the Internet—can constrain or enable certain forms of individual 
behavior. Hence the code can potentially be directed by regulators in such a way to arrive at more optimal 
forms of policy.”).  
 78. Interview with Dan Arbel, supra note 47; Interview with Zion Caspi, supra note 22; Interview with 
Yitzhak Ravivi, supra note 67. We should note that in the 1990’s, Israel saw a generational transformation. 
The population dramatically increased, as a result of immigration, primarily from the former Soviet Union, but 
also from Ethiopia. See, e.g., Dvora Hacohen, Mass Immigration and the Demographic Revolution in Israel, 8 
ISR. AFF. 177, 182–185 (2001). Population growth (and the accompanying frictions) led to an increase in civil 
and criminal disputes. Concomitantly, Israel had emerged from a deep economic crisis, experiencing 
substantial growth in economic activities and significant processes of privatization. See DAPHNE BARAK-EREZ, 
חרזא- נןית-כרצ ן -  הנתשמ הנידמב לשממו קוח  [CITIZEN-SUBJECT-CONSUMER—LAW AND GOVERNMENT IN A 
CHANGING STATE] 77–127 (2012) (Heb.); ITZHAK GALNOOR ET AL., PRIVATIZATION POLICY IN ISRAEL: STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BOUNDARIES BETWEEN THE PUBLIC AND THE PRIVATE] (2015) (Heb.); EYAL PELEG, 
 םוסרפכ הטרפה– ירוביצה קוחב םייטרפ םימרוג  [PRIVATIZATION AS PUBLICIZATION—PRIVATIZED BODIES IN PUBLIC 
LAW] (2005) (Heb.). Market-based economic growth is often accompanied by a rise in litigation. See Gerhard 
Clemenz & Klaus Gugler, Macroeconomic Development and Civil Litigation, 9 EU. J.L. & ECON. 215, 216 
(2000). Furthermore, as technology evolved and with the acceleration of globalization, economic (and 
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percentage of lawyers in society climbed at the turn of the century: by the late 
1990’s and early 2000’s, Israel had many more lawyers per capita.79 As 
lawyers became more entrepreneurial—as a result of the increased 
competition, in response to a suppressed demand, or as part of the development 
of more sophisticated causes of action that usually follow economic growth—
some judges did not keep up with the rise of litigation and the intensifying 
demands for swift resolutions. Little wonder that our interviews reveal that 
presidents of courts felt, around that period in particular, that prevailing 
judicial management practices should be critically revisited.80  
Director Arbel realized that expanding the administrative perspective to 
include a regulative dimension may not only bring courts up to par with law 
offices and meet warehousing concerns, but it may also assist in mitigating 
some of the root problems afflicting, in his view, the system as a whole. These 
included the issue of regulating the manner in which judges (and lawyers) were 
performing their duties, so that the legal process would achieve greater 
efficiency. He therefore wholeheartedly embraced the structural perspective,81 
premised on the notion that technology offers an architecture for command and 
control.82 
Arbel, Director of Courts as of 1998, based his vision on his own 
experience as the President of the Magistrate Courts of Tel Aviv-Jaffa and 
Central Districts.83 In that latter capacity, Arbel initiated and oversaw the 
 
criminal) misfeasance became more sophisticated. See, e.g., URI RAM, THE GLOBALIZATION OF ISRAEL: 
MCWORLD IN TEL AVIV, JIHAD IN JERUSALEM (2005). As a sociological matter, the rise in caseload can be 
attributed to the further diversification of the society and the failure of the hegemony-based social structures 
that offer dispute resolution outside the court system to cope with the increase in demand for dispute resolution 
within and across social groups. Social scientists and legal historians have claimed that disputes are litigated 
when other forms of dispute resolutions fail. These alternative forms include turning to respected figures, who 
are held as honest resolvers of disputes pursuant to the values of the community. Such a system works so long 
as the disputes are largely occurring within the community, or so long as one community enjoys a hegemonic 
status, and therefore other communities follow its practices. See e.g., Bruce H. Mann, The Formalization of 
Informal Law: Arbitration Before the American Revolution, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443 (1984). Israel, a divided 
society, moved from a collectivist ethos and socialist tendencies towards a neo-liberal market-based economy 
in the 1980s. See, e.g., Ran Hirschl, Israel’s ‘Constitutional Revolution’” The Legal Interpretation of 
Entrenched Civil Liberties in an Emerging Neo-Liberal Economic Order 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 427 (1998), 427–
428). This ostensibly, led to an increase in commercial disputes—some of which were complex and across 
economic sectors—and a decrease of reliance on non-litigious forms of dispute resolution. 
 79. Raanan Sulitzeanu-Keinan et al., Judicial Burden—A Comparative Study of 17 States (Haifa Center 
for Public Management and Policy 2007) (Heb.). 
 80. See Interview with Dan Arbel, supra note 47; Caspi’s interview, supra note 44; Gonen’s interview, 
supra note 60; Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14. 
 81. See Interview with Dan Arbel, supra note 47. 
 82. The literature on command-and-control regulation is vast. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, 
Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (2003); Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing 
Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
103, 103-18 (1998) and Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. 
L. REV. 1333 (1985).  
 83. Arbel served as the president of the Tel-Aviv and Central Magistrate Courts in the years 1994–1998. 
See Dan Arbel, ISR. JUD. AUTH., https://judgescv.court.gov.il/898584ba-645e-e811-8105-
0050568a6817%D7%93%D7%9F-%D7%90%D7%A8%D7%91%D7%9C (last visited Mar. 20, 2020) (Heb.).
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regular operation of the “Performance Report System” (nicknamed 
“Clouds”).84 Clouds was designed to assist Arbel in managing “his” courts by 
allocating cases among judges and considering judges scheduling requests. The 
Clouds system had first taken baby steps in structuring Arbel’s courts’ 
administration by generating notifications when a judge’s roster showed 
significant delays or when a case lingered excessively in the pre-trial phase.85 
Arbel’s performance system was better than the manual alternative but it was 
outdated from a technological and managerial perspective, and it was clearly 
inadequate for the management of the entire Israeli judiciary. However, the 
idea was there—using technology to solve the core problems of the judiciary:86 
caseload, case-management, and the lack of a proper clearinghouse. Moreover, 
the technological approach was there, too—using technology as a channeling 
means, whereby boundaries were set to ensure judges’ compliance with their 
superiors’ expectations. Thus, whereas the impetus was administrative in 
nature, in the sense that the turn to technology was originally informed by 
administrative concerns, within Arbel’s vision the policy goals were perceived 
on a grander scale.  
An ambitious—perhaps overly ambitious—decision was made to embark 
on a striking project that would digitize and standardize the registrars of all 
courts, control the scheduling of cases, and structure the entire system’s 
warehouse where cases resided after being launched and before conclusion. It 
would also create a networked judiciary where chambers, courtrooms, and 
registrar offices were on the same network (per court, and with an option to 
establish a national network). It would provide more complete statistical data. 
Crucially, the system was also expected to structure the judicial process; 
namely, the system’s architecture had to ensure that judges processed cases 
according to a pre-ordained procedure, which took into account their caseload 
and pending motions.  
Furthermore, so complete was the faith in technology as the bridge to a 
better and brighter future that the system was expected to usher in a fully 
digitized judicial process. This emerging vision was of wall-to-wall “E-filing” 
or a “Paperless Court.” It contemplated a comprehensive system through which 
the entire legal proceeding—the submission of court evidence included—
would be digitized.87 The Paperless Court had several objectives, such as 
 
 84. The nickname was derived from the system’s screen background, which resembled clouds. See 
Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14. 
 85. A case was considered “delayed” whenever no further session was set (for example, for sentencing or 
hearing), even though it had already gone through the summary phase. Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 
14. 
 86. See Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 6, at 34–35, who suggests that technology will increase efficiency, 
and will solve judicial problems. (“Efficiency is promoted by digital technologies on many levels. Court 
proceedings become more efficient for the parties involved, for their attorneys, for the individual judges and 
for the civil justice system as a whole.”). 
 87. An early version of the idea of digitization of the legal process can be seen in Nihan & Wheeler, 
supra note 5, at 672. (“[T]he Judicial Center has been able to develop and test a further procedure for efficient 
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reducing the number of court files, thereby alleviating storage space shortage, 
preventing file disappearance, improving archival searches, and reducing to a 
minimum attorneys’ visits to the courts.88 The guiding rationale was self-
evident: once all components of the process are digitized, judges can easily 
access any needed materials (ranging from evidence to submissions and from 
past precedents to decisions in similar matters by other courts). Consequently, 
considerable bureaucratic hassle is spared, and judicial output is more 
coherent, timely, and reliable, without hand-written notes on cluttered and 
misplaced papers.  
In accordance with this bold scheme, by the early 2000s the 
Administration was in the process of conducting a rather fascinating 
experiment of the “Virtual Courtroom,” whose pilot was launched in May 
2001 at the Ramla Magistrate Court (in the late Judge Shmuel Baruch’s 
court).89 The pilot lasted for a year and a half and served as a field test.90 It was 
based on experimental, innovative technologies not commercially available 
anywhere else at the time. The pilot included the scanning of written evidence 
(or photographing physical evidence) as it was submitted to court and 
electronically storing it as an integral part of the case file. It also included on-
screen, live presentation of court records, videotaping of testimonies, and the 
video recording of courtroom interactions.  
In July 2000, as the preparations for the pilot were underway, and as the 
Mainframe and CMS were faltering, the Administration published a public 
tender, inviting companies to develop, operate, and maintain a computerized 
infrastructure for the entire Israeli judiciary.91 It was decided that the State 
lacked the capacity to develop the infrastructure itself, but should play a 
leading role in its design.92 The tender specified the following features of the 
requested infrastructure: computation of the courts secretariats’ standard 
activities (such as documentation and registration of files), setting dates for 
 
court management . . . the court’s docket sheet information is electronically recorded in the main Courtran 
computers, thus creating the official docket, albeit an electronic docket, of their cases.”). 
 88. These objectives were compatible with Arbel’s technological vision. See Interview with Dan Arbel, 
supra note 47. 
 89. See Interview with Dan Arbel, supra note 47; Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14. 
 90. See Caspi’s Interview, supra note 44 (arguing that this pilot provoked a lot of interest amongst 
lawyers and judges alike). 
 91. See Interview with Dan Arbel, supra note 47 (claiming that the tender was another step in the 
technological evolution). The decision to launch the ambitious tender was against the advice of the Israel Bar 
Association, whose standing Computation Committee was headed by adv. Ron Gazit. As the Administration 
considered launching a tender to technologically overhaul the Israeli judiciary, Gazit and the Committee met 
regularly with Judge Arbel and Administration personnel. The Committee members read the tender draft, to 
which they presented many objections and remarks. As later events would reveal, the Committee’s objections 
were certainly not unfounded. The Israel Bar had self-sufficiently created “Bar-Net”—its own tool that would 
have allowed lawyers to electronically submit files to courts. However, the endeavor did not succeed due to 
logistical and financial difficulties. Thus, Legal-Net remained the sole option of ‘E-Filing’ or paperless court. 
See Interview with Adv. Haim Ravia, former head of the Israel Bar Association Computing Committee, supra 
note 22. 
 92. See Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14.  
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court sessions, and issuance of summons (all of which had been done thus far 
manually); credible use of electronic filing (with the use of electronic signature 
mechanisms); digitizing storage space; and development of statistical and data 
management capabilities. Since most of the technologies needed for these 
features were not on the shelf, the State reserved the right to supplement the 
just-mentioned requirements by adding further details as the system developed. 
At the beginning, the tender initiative seemed promising and exciting. It 
was a truly innovative venture, with the potential of leading the Israeli 
judiciary to the new frontier where no judiciary had gone before. Moreover, 
the Finance Ministry—usually a conservative body weary of risky moves with 
public funds—agreed to secure a hefty sum of money for the project. The 
Finance Ministry’s endorsement was seen by those involved as an indication 
that the planned course of action was indeed promising.93 Alas, future events 
would reveal how over-optimistic State officials involved in the endeavor had 
been (or, conversely, the extent of resources actually needed for such grand 
innovation). In order to understand the failure of this bold move, which had left 
the system tethering on the brink of returning to pen-and-paper ledgers, three 
developments should be noted.  
First, during the months following the publication of the tender, it became 
clear that the tender and the discussions surrounding it stirred critical reactions 
among judges.94 As a general matter, the judges were not eager to cooperate 
with the process,95 as they did not see how their needs were fully integrated in 
its design.96 Already at the outset, as some consultation with judges began to 
take place, judges realized that in fact the anticipated infrastructure might 
restrict their discretion regarding case management, shifting it to “the 
computer” in the vein of the CMS and the Clouds, only on a larger scale.97 For 
example, the system was projected to strictly manage case allocation without 
accepting overrides from judges. Equally troubling, from the perspective of 
judges, it could potentially lock judges in by forcing them to conclude the 
business the system defined as urgent (or overdue) before they could move to 
other cases. It would thus enforce upon judges a set of tasks they must 
complete, with deadlines, or else they would not be able to proceed with any 
 
 93. See Okon’s Interview, supra note 33; Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14. Both dispute this 
decision in hindsight. 
 94. See Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30.  
 95. It should be noted, however, that several of the court’s secretariats were also unwilling to cooperate 
with the endeavor, as they were concerned that the projected technological revolution would be detrimental to 
their future employment. Caspi’s Interview, supra note 44.  
 96. For example, judges had not played an active part in the design stage of the secretariat’s computation 
process. See supra text accompanying note 47; Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14. 
 97. Gonen’s Interview, supra note 60; Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14; Okon’s Interview, supra 
note 33. For an example of American judges expressing fear that management structures would undermine 
their judicial discretion, see Carolyn Dubay, A Country Without Courts: Doing More with Less in Twenty-First 
Century Federal Courts, 48 NEW. ENG. L. REV. 531, 536 (2013) (quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist as stating 
that “bureaucratization and increased management structures will leave the judges less freedom to exercise 
personal judgment”). 
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other task—and of course with their presidents (and the Director of Courts) 
aware of such infractions. As a result, some judges expressed their resentment 
towards the project.98 It became evident that designing and later implementing 
the new infrastructure went well beyond the scope of housekeeping. At the 
same time, as with the judicial reaction to the CMS, some saw judges’ hostility 
as an indication of the need to resort to such technology to ensure 
accountability and strict judicial compliance.99 
Second, as extant technology was not yet ready, especially if expected to 
be compatible with the Paperless Court vision,100 there was little comparative 
experience upon which to rely. Unsurprisingly, the Paperless Court attracted 
some criticism. It was argued that it was too pretentious and beyond the reach 
of judges, most of whom were clearly not as technologically proficient as 
Judge Baruch (nor were they as technophiles as Director Arbel).101 Judge 
Baruch himself thought that the actual use of technology in his court diverted 
his attention away from judging.102 But most importantly, it was established 
that the technology was not advanced enough at that stage to meet the 
requirement of a fully digitized courtroom.103 By late 2002 the test was 
terminated.104 
And third, project leaders realized early on that, as there was no blueprint 
outlining the specific, detailed requirements the system would have to meet, it 
would have to be devised on the fly. This meant that the asking price submitted 
in the tender was projected to reflect a rather high degree of uncertainty.105 
Little wonder, then, that only one company, Electronic Data Systems (EDS), 
had responded to the tender. Its offering was higher than the Administration’s 
original estimation of the project, causing the Tenders Committee to reject the 
offer, thus essentially bringing the public tender process to an end.106  
 
 98. Okon claimed he had no control over the system’s performance even though he was one of its 
planners. But see Jennifer Chandler, The Autonomy of Technology: Do Courts Control Technology or Do They 
Just Legitimize Its Social Acceptance? 27 BULL. SCI. TECH. & SOC. 339, 341 (2007) (“Instead, the idea reflects 
a sense that despite our belief that we direct the development of technologies and choose whether or not to use 
them, this control is more or less illusory.”). In regard to judges’ approach to technology influencing their 
work, see Coffin, supra note 73, at 399 (“Even when the marvels of the electronic age are made available to 
judges, the very bulk of information obtainable, the plethora of uses suggested, and the rapidity of 
communication may be seen to threaten the traditional processes of deliberation, discussion, and decision.”).  
 99. Caspi’s Interview, supra note 44; Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30; For an argument in 
favor of more judicial transparency, see also Lynn LoPucki, Court System Transparency, 94 IOWA L. REV. 
481, 538 (2008–2009).  
 100. Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30. 
 101. These views were also made, amongst others, by Adv. Ron Gazit. Gazit, the head of the Computation 
Committee of the Israel bar association at that time and one of the leading professionals in his field. See Moshe 
Gorali, The High Price of the “Paperless Court” Vision, HAARETZ (Aug. 17, 2011) 
https://www.haaretz.co.il/misc/1.795216 (discussing the paperless court in May 2002); see also Interview with 
Haim Gonen, supra note 22.  
 102. Interview with Haim Gonen, supra note 22.  
 103. Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22; Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14.  
 104. Interview with Haim Gonen, supra note 22. 
 105. Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30. 
 106. Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14. 
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Following the cancellation of the tender, the funds reserved for the 
project returned to the Finance Ministry.107 The Administration of Courts went 
back to the drawing board, scrambling to make the best out of the core ideas 
underlying the tender. Its response laid the grounds for what later came to be 
known as Legal-Net. 
C. THE MANAGERIAL-INTEGRATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
The months following the tender’s failure were rather chaotic. The 
Administration was still committed to the project. It determinedly assured the 
Knesset (Israel’s parliament) that things were still moving along, given the 
mounting critique,108 and while the secured budget for the venture was 
“retrieved” by the Finance Ministry, in the wake of the tender’s collapse, 
attempts were made to guarantee a yearly budget for the development of the 
judiciary technological apparatus. As the Administration tried to figure out 
what went wrong, four factors stood out. First, awareness that sitting judges 
should be better integrated into the design of the sought-after technologies 
sunk in.109 Second, and related, the key players—the Administration, courts’ 
presidents, the IT team—realized that technology should not necessarily be 
used in a command-and-control fashion, by rigidly ordering judges how to 
conduct their business, in order to minimize judicial resistance.110 Third, the 
Administration and the IT team understood that while a sweeping 
technological vision was necessary, it was more advisable to treat the promise 
embedded in novel technologies more modestly,111 as well as to proceed one 
module at a time in the hope of allowing for better configuration of tested 
technologies and their smoother integration in the existing infrastructure.112 
And lastly, it was recognized that the specifications of the system should be at 
a much greater detail in order to minimize economic uncertainty for software 
companies and thus accommodate market concerns.113 At the same time, 
Arbel’s vision regarding the managerial uses of data was already well 
 
 107. Interview with Dan Arbel, supra note 47. 
 108. See The Protocols of the Knesset Constitution, Law and Justice Committee on October 20, 2003, 
http://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/committees/Huka/Pages/CommitteeProtocols.aspx (Heb.). 
 109. See Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22; Interview with Boaz Okon, supra note 33; 
Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14. 
 110. As a general matter, it appears that the Administration sought to pursue the development of the 
judiciary’s technology with as little resistance as possible. This probably explained the fact that it made 
significant advances in this area in the less hostile territories of the secretariats of the criminal and civil 
departments, as well as that of the labor and traffic courts, since both were less opposed to the integration of 
modern technology. See Interview with Zion Caspi, supra note 22. 
 111. See Cockfield & Pridmore, supra note 48, at 490 (“[T]echnology is only a tool and has no inherent 
structure.”).  
 112. Interview with Dan Arbel, supra note 47; Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22. 
 113. Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30. 
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entrenched. So was his recognition that unified, fully integrated and networked 
technologies must be developed for the system to be properly managed.114 
As circumstances imposed themselves on the Administration of Courts, 
the IT team realized it had to prioritize the most urgent administrative 
necessities without a grand design.115 But it was not clear how to prioritize, 
given that the previous working assumption was that the entire system would 
be overhauled. As a first emergency step, three technology companies signed 
an agreement for the maintenance of the existing technological 
infrastructure,116 but it was unclear what “maintenance” included, as fixing 
malfunctions depended on required technological advancements. 
Since a much higher level of specification had to be attained, and the 
incremental approach was the preferred option, the IT professional team, 
humbled by its hitherto unrealistic methodology, contacted software companies 
to determine what it would take to develop the various necessary modules. At 
the same time, in order to ensure the “buy-in” of the various stakeholders, the 
IT and the Administration of Courts realized it was necessary to comprise a 
detailed breakdown of the exact needs of various components of the system 
and its members – judges and administrators alike. With that in mind, the IT 
team took the lead in trying to determine the various features the system would 
have to deliver, and their relative priorities.117 
Under this approach, the regulative function of technology appears in 
reverse order: because technological development—as the Administration 
slowly realized—required clear and precise details, a process for establishing 
these details had to first be put in place. Since no one segment of the 
organization had, up to that point, a clear understanding of the specific 
workflows of each and every segment of the entire organization, and as, upon 
completion, the cooperation of the various segments would be necessary, the 
Administration embarked on a rather intensive process of consultation.118 The 
process encouraged participation and deliberation among some members of the 
various segments of the system. But even more importantly, as technological 
solutions were contemplated, questions about ways to integrate the various 
components were also raised and discussed. Similarly, questions about 
permissions, access, control, and override were also considered.  
The processes of developing specifications for the various technological 
features had an interesting organizational impact: it generated a sense of 
belonging to a whole. The process called upon the various segments of the 
system to articulate their needs, which cultivated a sense of a community. A 
 
 114. See Interview with Dan Arbel, supra note 47; Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22 (both 
demonstrating, once again, the importance of judicial authority to the technological team). 
 115. Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14; Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22 (emphasizing 
the technological team’s need in creating interim, yet modular, solutions). 
 116. They were Ness Technologies Ltd., IBM Global Services (IGS), and Taldor. Yardeni’s First 
Interview, supra note 14; Interview with Haim Gonen, supra note 22. 
 117. Interview with Haim Gonen, supra note 22; Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30. 
 118. Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30. 
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similar dynamic would later repeat itself, as the design of each of the modules 
was contemplated and later developed and implemented, technology was 
harnessed to serve as a platform shared by all segments of the bureaucratic 
apparatus, thereby bringing them together and constructing a sense of a unified 
organizational identity.119 Technology—participation in its development by 
way of expressing the administrative needs, deciding collaboratively on 
priorities and designing synchronized workflows—was instrumental in 
transforming the court system into a unit in and of itself.120 Each component of 
the system was present in the online, networked system, and was aware of the 
challenges the other components were facing. A different approach to 
technology therefore emerged: technology as an integrative platform, where 
management pursues organizational goals, related to establishing a sense of 
shared mission and common practices of communication about such mission.  
It should be emphasized, however, that under this approach technology 
does not only integrate, it also generates power and hierarchy, albeit 
indirectly.121 Technology determines who may know what about whom, and 
who may be authorized to do what with respect to whom and under what 
conditions. The relationship between technology and power-structures had 
been directly and vividly visible to all under the previous approach—the top-
down “grand-design” approach that sought to harness technology to erect 
“walls” in order to herd judges in. Under the approach to technology as a 
professional-community-building tool, power and hierarchy were less obvious, 
but nonetheless very much present. Access and permission rules were 
discussed, and a decision had to be taken by the heads of the organization and 
then justified to the rest of the members. It is this aspect that forced the men 
and women working on the system to consider the fourth perspective: the 
values perspective.  
D. THE VALUES PERSPECTIVE 
Our research reveals that Legal-Net cannot be fully understood without 
realizing that the policy choices embedded therein consciously reflect 
values.122 Pursuant to the consultation processes, and having in mind the initial 
 
 119. For a description of a “Facilitator-type” of regulation and of regulator, see Yair Sagy, A Triptych of 
Regulators: A New Perspective on the Administrative State, 44 AKRON L. REV. 425, 432 (2011) (“[He or she] 
facilitates public action by providing civic fora where fact-gathering and fact-processing mechanisms are 
employed.”).  
 120. For a discussion of “judicial production as team work,” see Ginsburg & Garoupa, supra note 17, at 
231.  
 121. See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Foreword: Technology’s Transformation of the Regulatory Endeavor, 26 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1315 (2011) (“[R]egulators have taken to heart the cyberspace lesson that ‘[i]f 
code is law . . . ‘control of code is power,’ enlisting technological capacity in the pursuit of policy aims” 
(second and third alterations in original) (footnote omitted)). According to this approach, technology produces 
power; the more advanced stage is the government understanding that control of technology is the control 
itself.  
 122. Lawrence Lessig, Law Regulating Code Regulating Law, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 14 (2003) (“[T]he 
single most salient feature of cyberspace is its ability to embed controls that resist or reinforce values that we 
618 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:589 
push-back from the judges, the normative dimension of the design was 
recognized by its designers, who took pains to ensure that the value choices 
ingrained therein would be made explicit and could be explained and defended. 
This latter perspective revealed itself most clearly around November 
2003, a point in time which marked a distinctly new phase in the evolving 
design of Legal-Net. This phase was associated above all with Judge Boaz 
Okon, Arbel’s future successor, and the man who could be rightly considered 
Legal-Net’s chief designer.123 It was on Okon’s watch that it was decided that 
the visionary Paperless Court would be replaced by a system that would center 
on paperless communication, but not necessarily digitize the interactions in the 
courthouse itself – at least not at the first stage. Moreover, it was Okon who 
decided, together with the IT team, that in order to proceed with the 
incremental approach the legal process itself had to be analyzed, accordingly, 
in greater detail.124 
Okon had become deeply involved with the development of the modules 
following the collapse of the ambitious tender during the transitional stage 
detailed above under the Integrative Perspective.125 Back then, the design team 
requested that a judge be assigned to closely accompany its work.126 Okon 
seemed to be a natural choice for the task, having been in charge of the 
creation of the abovementioned Supreme Court log during his term as the 
Supreme Court Registrar.127  
According to Okon, however, in his capacity as the accompanying judge, 
he merely tried to implement Chief Justice Barak’s vision of Legal-Net, which 
was premised on certain principles.128 It appears that although Chief Justice 
Barak was far from being tech-savvy—until his retirement he wrote his 
judgment with a pencil on paper—he did consider the development of a sound 
judicial-management system as highly important. Chief Justice Barak 
approached most questions regarding the role of the judiciary with values in 
mind—primarily liberal democratic values. Hence, the principles thereafter 
embedded in the systems were—and henceforth will be—referred to as “the 
 
bring to cyberspace. We must understand the manner in which these values are resisted or reinforced if we are 
to continue the experiment of self-government, where self-conscious choice determines the law we live life 
subject to.”). Lessig argues that the uniqueness of cyberspace is in assimilating the values that humans 
themselves brought with them when they built this space. Id. As indicated in the text, we agree, of course.  
 123. According to Yardeni, it was predetermined that the design process would take thirty-eight months. 
See Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14. On July 15, 2004, Judge Boaz Okon replaced Judge Arbel as 
Director of the Courts.  
 124. See Interview with Boaz Okon, supra note 33; Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30. 
 125. See Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22; Interview with Boaz Okon, supra note 33; 
Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30. 
 126. Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14. 
 127. See The Protocols of the Knesset Constitution, Law and Justice Committee on July 13, 2004, 
http://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/committees/Huka/Pages/CommitteeProtocols.aspx (Heb.). It seems that 
Okon’s involvement with the Supreme Court’s computation was highly praised by Knesset Members during a 
session of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee dealing with the computation of the courts. 
 128. Interview with Boaz Okon, supra note 33.  
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Barak principles.” However, our research reveals that Okon played an 
instrumental role, not only because he participated in the formation of the 
principles, but also because it was the integration of principles to technology 
that made Legal-Net what it is.  
Stated broadly, for Barak (and Okon), managing a judiciary was (also) a 
normative exercise, and since technology was being placed at the heart of the 
managerial process, it should be designed with normative values in mind.129 
First among these values was transparency and accountability. As Barak saw it, 
new technologies were critical to improving the judiciary’s daily bookkeeping 
management, inter alia, for it would help courts generate coherent, unified, and 
reliable case-load reports. Such reports were crucial to making the judiciary 
more transparent and thus more accountable—both to the general public and 
the community of judges and court administrators.  
Given the prominence of transparency and accountability in Barak’s 
thinking of judicial management, he took what may be characterized as a 
show-them-the-numbers approach, believing that exposing to the general 
public the judiciary’s caseload in a reliable and “neutral” manner would 
contribute to the overall standing of the judiciary with the public as well as 
with the other branches of government, such as the Finance Ministry. In other 
words, Barak was convinced that transparency would reveal to all that courts 
were overworked and doing their best under the circumstances, so that further 
resources should be allocated to the judiciary. It seems that Barak was under 
the assumption that, once it was understood how strained the judiciary was and 
that judges were exceedingly hard-working and committed, not only could the 
judiciary dispel unwarranted critique, but a convincing case for securing 
additional judicial appointments and budgetary increase for the judiciary could 
be made. A side-benefit might be giving the judiciary greater autonomy to run 
its own affairs. 
According to Okon, Barak was also invested in the judiciary’s overall 
legitimacy. In our context, he realized that public confidence in the courts 
relied on their ability to produce justice in a timely fashion, without 
compromising due process, and therefore, to him, backlog was a serious 
problem, as were pressures—such as time pressures—limiting the ability of 
judges to conduct their business fairly. He held that the quality of service given 
to the general public by courts must be improved, and he hoped that the 
introduction of better technology to the judiciary would be a decisive step 
forward in this respect (together with other efforts, such as encouraging 
ADR).130 
 
 129. Arthur J. Cockfield, Towards a Law and Technology Theory, 30 MANITOBA L.J. 383 (2004).  
 130. Interview with Boaz Okon, supra note 33. It should be noted, however, that such values— 
accountability, transparency, fairness and rationality in managing the system —also happen to support a shift 
away from access to courts as an individual right to the production of justice as providing a public service, and 
then a further shift to court management as an exercise of allocating scarce public resources. This shift is in 
line with instrumental business-management approaches that value cost-benefit analysis, which were in tension 
with the ethos of the judiciary (as an institution committed to justice in individual cases). Under a more critical 
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Barak and Okon recognized that visible disparities among courts 
(including in the timeliness of their operation, resource allocation, and overall 
performance and professional execution of case management) threatened the 
appearance of the rule of law. They realized that the (mis)perception that 
judges or court presidents sought to minimize exposure of the manner in which 
they conducted their business was corrosive. A perception that judges were 
hiding their inefficiencies or obfuscating discrepancies in time spent on 
similarly situated cases threatened the public confidence in the courts.  
At the same time, Barak and Okon also appreciated the importance of the 
internal-managerial perspective on information. They believed that 
transparency and the information generated by the system would enable the 
judiciary’s heads to realize how efficient each judge, court, and district was. 
They realized that technology-induced transparency could work inwardly. It 
might motivate judges, courts, and clusters of courts (for example, several 
courts within a district) to ensure that they were better than average. It would 
also avoid unnecessary arguments about case allocation, and other managerial 
decisions, such as where to place further resources, whether a request to teach 
or to go on a sabbatical by a judge should be granted, etc.131 Barak and Okon 
were also well aware, following the CMS period, that judges were sensitive to 
equality of treatment; namely, they cared a great deal about their standing in 
comparison to their peers. They wondered, for instance, if a judge was 
summoned to discuss his or her performance, would all other similarly situated 
judges be so treated?132 Transparency-through-technology could alleviate such 
concerns and make courts’ management visibly fairer in the eyes of judges.  
Consequently, one of Barak and Okon’s seminal ideas was to map the 
“routes,” or life cycles, of typical cases, divided into the different major legal 
fields and broken down into their constitutive, standard segments.133 The 
resultant matrix was to be projected both internally and externally. Internally, 
breaking down the legal process to routinized segments would enable the 
analysis of the judicial and administrative resources that each typical set of 
cases (for example, criminal, administrative, and so on) required. It was in this 
context that Okon worked hard to develop “weights” that might allow the 
comparison of one type of judicial proceeding to another, in terms of 
administrative and judicial load. Externally, it aimed to provide the general 
public with an accessible roadmap to complex judicial procedures and 
litigation schemes. Here the idea was to educate the public on the workings of 
the legal system in order to increase accessibility (and counter the claim that 
the system was byzantine and inefficient). Okon realized that having a better, 
 
analysis, therefore, the value-based approach also generated buy-in from the judiciary, by diffusing normative 
objections, while ultimately being consonant with treating adjudication no different from any other 
government-provided bureaucratic service.  
 131. Id.  
 132. Interview with Zion Caspi, supra note 22; Interview with Boaz Okon, supra note 33. 
 133. Interview with Boaz Okon, supra note 33. 
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more rational understanding of the legal process could enable superior 
management of the judiciary; it could allow for better-informed research into 
the impact of possible legal reforms on the judiciary.  
Another inventive scheme that was particularly dear in the Barak-Okon 
mindset was that of creating a “central data clearinghouse.” Under this scheme, 
all cases, wherever submitted, would arrive to one hub from which they would 
be distributed to various judges according to their caseload and availability, 
and where they would also be supervised and monitored. This scheme was said 
to allow for a panoramic viewpoint from which “traffic jams” and other 
problems would be located and centrally dealt with. 
Okon sought to translate these general principles and schemes into core 
operating principles, which would then underlie the design of Legal-Net. Our 
findings reveal that from the very early stages of the Legal-Net design it was 
explicitly intended to have considerable and effective managerial capacities, so 
it would control the different phases of the judicial process while monitoring 
judges’ actions and performance.134 It was also understood that such 
governance was a normative exercise. 
At the same time, the lessons of the grand tender were still fresh: Okon, 
being a District Court judge himself (and a highly esteemed one, both in terms 
of his legal knowledge and in managerial skills), knew that a policy to use 
technology in order to force judges in one way or another would be highly 
costly, and likely to fail.135 Nudging, by way of harnessing judicial reputation, 
seemed much more effective. Moreover, Okon very much approved of the 
modular approach, even if that entailed that not all features of the system 
would have been operational at once, provided the modules were developed 
with an overarching purpose (and normative underpinning) in mind.136  
But the great attention to values would have likely not gone very far were 
it not married with the relevant technology. It is safe to say, therefore, that the 
most significant technological decision taken by Okon (and his IT team) was to 
introduce a certain technological framework as the core of what later became 
Legal-Net. That decision allowed for the development of the system to 
progress and also set, to a considerable extent, its course. In everyday life, 
there is a tendency to think of programming code as ‘neutral’ or ‘transparent’ 
 
 134. Id.; Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14. 
 135. See Coffin, supra note 73, at 399 (“It is understandable that many judges feel that the basic values 
that once attracted and sustained their enthusiasm and sense of self-worth are at risk.”). Coffin suggests that 
the whole world of judgment is changing, and that values from the past are in danger in the face of novel 
technologies. See id. It also appears that judges feel threatened by this change and therefore do not welcome it. 
This observation fits in with Okon’s approach. Okon, it seems, knew that imposing a certain modus operandi 
on the judges might be thwarted by their opposition to the whole spirit of change. See Interview with Boaz 
Okon, supra note 33; see also Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22; Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra 
note 30. 
 136. Okon decided that Legal-Net would start operating even before it would be developed fully and that 
it would be modified along the way, instead of being implemented as a complete and full system. In addition to 
deciding to go for a flexible design process, Okon also determined that the set of rules programmed into BPM 
would be altered throughout the designing process. Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30. 
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in the sense that what matters is its function, performance, perhaps graphic 
design, but not necessarily the actual technical language, or software 
architecture used (and definitely not the politics or values baked into the 
technical architecture). Law-and-technology scholars have long noted that this 
is wrong—code matters.137 The decision to turn to Business Process 
Management (BPM) is perhaps the clearest case on point, surely in our 
context. Adopting BPM architecture arguably transformed the way judicial 
management is approached with, as we will show, some unintended 
consequences. 
IV.  THE AGE OF BUSINESS PROCESS MANAGEMENT (BPM)  
According to one definition, BPM is 
A method by which a business undergoes inspection of the entire operation 
of its network to evaluate processes, termed workflow, and to make specific 
recommendations for improved efficiency and productivity as a way to 
optimize operations. Using the information storage capacity of software to 
understand how a business produces a good or service, BPM is a business 
template for grasping the big picture of a network operation.”138  
It follows that BPM technology, then, is an architecture (software, hardware, 
network) that implements this method so as to efficiently monitor, implement, 
and analyze complex production processes.  
Several elements in BPM’s definition merit our attention. BPM is 
commonly used in the private corporate and industrial world as a tool for 
efficient management of private enterprises. It is a tool intended to inspect and 
supervise, for example, the production processes of complex assembly lines.139 
Further, as a management tool, BPM is meant to improve business processes 
by facilitating the “translation” of overall business and production processes 
 
 137. Lessig, supra note 122, at 3–4. Lessig argues that, while some may think that “policymaking from 
this perspective is simply the process of tuning legal code,” from the perspective of those attuned to the 
technological dimension, “[p]olicymaking cannot function focused on legal code alone. Id. “Policymaking 
instead requires a consideration of the interaction between this legal code and the architecture or technology 
within which this code functions.” Id. For a more general discussion of the regulatory function of code see 
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (2000). 
 138. Joseph Dewey, Business Process Management, SCRIBD, https://www.scribd.com/document/ 
333271935/Business-Process-Management (last visited Mar. 20, 2020). Another possible definition is, “[BPM] 
is a management discipline focused on using business process as significant contributor to achieving an 
organization’s objectives through the improvement, ongoing performance management and governance of 
essential business process.” John Jeston, The Perpetual Question—What Is Business Process Mangement?, 
BPTRENDS, https://www.bptrends.com/bpt/wp-content/uploads/11-05-2013%20COL-Down%20Under-
What%20is%20BPM-John%20Jeston.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2020). BPM’s core idea, that production 
processes may be amenable to alternations and improvements, is not new, of course. In fact, it dates back to 
the early days of the 20th century. See HOWARD SMITH & PETER FINGAR, BUSINESS PROCESS MANAGEMENT: 
THE THIRD WAVE (2003).  
 139. JOHN JESTON & JOHAN NELIS, BUSINESS PROCESS MANAGEMENT: PRACTICAL GUIDELINES TO 
SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION 176, 304 (2d ed. 2006). One of the most famous examples of the use made by 
BPM in the industrial world was the development of the Toyota Production system (TPS). For the Toyota (as 
well as the GE) examples, see HOWARD SMITH & PETER FINGAR, supra note 138, at 41–42. 
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into a graphic display (or a numerical output) with a view to achieving better 
coordination between the various segments of a manufacturing or assembling 
plant (or within similar enterprises that produce goods in various locations or 
stages while relying on different processes and professional languages). BPM 
is therefore designed to establish better measurements for productivity and 
overall efficiency across production systems and is said to be conducive to 
more rational analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the different 
stages of active production processes in attaining optimization.140  
For its operation, BPM requires first that the production process be 
meticulously fragmented to its various components, so that each component is 
defined in terms of the actions entailed therein, their expected timing, and 
goals. Additionally, each such component is placed in relation to other 
components: the possible sequencing of the various components must be 
identified. More specifically, designing and implementing a BPM engine 
entails breaking down the processes to their segments, breaking down the 
segments into the minute steps that much be taken within each segment, and 
then plotting the steps that follow (or may follow) a previous step. 
Furthermore, the direction of the workflow must be carefully detailed (for 
example, can a stage or a segment be repeated? And if so, under which 
circumstances?). Expected durations of each stage must also be set. 
Furthermore, for each segment, failure indicators have to be established for the 
system to generate relevant alerts. The resulting artifact is a detailed map of the 
various paths and permutations of the different processes that lead from point 
A—the beginning of the production—to point Z—its conclusion, which also 
may be the starting point of another production process. For the BPM to take 
advantage of its potential, it should include yet another dimension: robust data 
collection and analysis of existing business processes, as actually conducted, in 
order to provide measures for success (or lack thereof), potentially on all levels 
(from the single worker to the entire unit).141  
The decision to adopt the BPM method and architecture emerged at a 
conclusion of two routes. The first was the post-tender consultation, noted 
above.142 The second was a survey done by the IT team regarding the 
technologies which might be suitable for building a new management system, 
one module at time. As for the first, following the tender fiasco and as part of 
the shift from a grand-design to the modular approach, Okon and the design 
 
 140. See Paul Harmon, Once More: Lean, the Toyota Production System, Six Sigma, and BPM, BUS. 
PROCESS TRENDS, http://www.bptrends.com/publicationfiles/advisor20121023.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2020). 
BPM is also employed in the public sector in Germany, Switzerland, and Austria. See Norbert Ahrend, 
Opportunities and Limitations of BPM Initiatives in Public Administrations Across Levels and Institutions 
(Mar. 28, 2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Humboldt University) (on file with the Humboldt University 
Library). 
 141. See SMITH & FINGAR, supra note 138, at 245–50.  
 142. See supra Subpart III.A. 
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team sought the advice of judges and administrative staff,143 inviting them not 
only to articulate their needs but also to join those developing the technological 
system, if only for a day or two.144 On those occasions, judges shared their 
perspectives regarding the issues that concerned them the most about the 
evolving system.145 They also addressed specifics, for instance, referring to 
parts of the criminal process that could benefit from better technological 
assistance or reflecting on how a segment of civil procedure worked, and 
therefore what should be accommodated by the system. Judges’ participation 
in the development process contributed significantly to the mapping of typical 
judicial proceedings and their soft points, as well as their breaking down to 
consecutive stages.  
While this process was advancing, the IT team was seeking a solution for 
an architecture that would support and structure judicial management. They 
discovered the BPM engines and started to consider their advantages and 
disadvantages. It was clear that any technical solution, and in particular the 
BPM solution, would require a granular parsing of the legal processes in Israel, 
including the scrupulous mapping of typical judicial proceedings and their 
careful breaking down into distinct sequential stages. Okon led this Herculean 
endeavor, which consumed hundreds of hours of his time.146 Working from an 
office in the software company that worked on Legal-Net, Okon canvassed the 
entire landscape of civil processes in Israel and the main criminal ones. He 
thought about typical and atypical eventualities, and the subtasks within each 
stage.147 Most importantly, at the end of this hard labor, forty-eight modular 
Lego-like bricks, representing the different stages of various typical judicial 
processes, were identified. These procedural segments, and the modular 
thinking underlying the research from which they emerged, are the foundation 
of Legal-Net.  
In the course of the process whereby the “bricks” (or modules) were 
identified, the Okon-led technical team became more familiar with a BPM 
engine. The fit between BPM and the bricks-methodology was apparent, and a 
decision was made to adopt the BPM architecture and a particular BPM 
software, and to convert the forty-eight basic bricks into production 
processes.148 Attempts were made to integrate the administrative needs of the 
secretariats, as expressed during the interim phase detailed above. Okon was 
also careful to consult with a select few judges in various courts to ensure that 
 
 143. Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22 (crediting Okon with the initiative to engage in these 
discussions). 
 144. Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22; Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30. This was, of 
course, completely in accordance with the Integrative Perspective, discussed supra Subpart III.C. 
 145. They were chosen by Okon according to their various areas of practice. Interview with Boaz Okon, 
supra note 33; Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30. 
 146. Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30. 
 147. See id. (detailing Okon’s detrimental contribution to the initiative); see also Interview with Shlomit 
Levy, supra note 22; Interview with Boaz Okon, supra note 33. 
 148. Interview with Boaz Okon, supra note 33; Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30. 
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he did not miss procedural junctures, although it should be stressed that the 
actual process of integrating civil and criminal procedures within the BPM 
technology did not involve a more general consultation with judges, as this was 
deemed impractical. 
The decision to place BPM at the heart of Legal-Net introduced myriad 
policy questions that had to be addressed, given the nature of BPM. They had 
to consider such questions as: To whom should judges report? (The practice is 
that, in principle, judges may be required to report to the president of the court, 
the Chief Justice, and/or the Administration.) Who could be privy to what 
information regarding judges’ performance? (As further indicated below, 
almost any member of the judiciary had, initially, plenary access to 
information, save for issues requiring confidentiality. This was later changed at 
the request of judges, allowing them to see only the status of colleagues’ 
cases.) What type of nudging or red flags might judges encounter regarding 
their pending tasks? (The underlying principle being that judges may ignore 
any flag and use their judgment to manage the case, yet flags are reported, and 
their records maintained.) Sequencing rules, too, were developed with respect 
to the various segments of each process and the ability to repeat a certain 
segment.  
As designed by Okon and his team, BPM became a comprehensive and 
truly penetrating architecture. Upon launching a case within Legal-Net, the 
BPM is engaged. It manages the entire process with respect to all judges at any 
court (save for the Supreme Court), and with respect to all judicial decisions. 
Since the basic “bricks” of the legal processes are factored in, the system 
knows what the next steps should be, as it is awaiting judicial response (or, 
later, response by parties to judicial interim decisions). Since judges’ schedules 
are managed by Legal-Net, the system knows when the next step is due and, 
thus, if no further step is scheduled, that is also noted.149 Moreover, based on 
the designers’ estimates and legislative mandates, a “time duration” unit was 
defined for each stage of the judicial process as a rule of thumb. As each stage 
of the judicial process is monitored by the BPM, to the extent a case does not 
follow the flow pre-configured in the BPM, or to the extent a deadline is 
missed, or a task left unattended, various alerts are generated dependent on the 
severity of the infraction. In general, the Legal-Net BPM component has three 
levels of alerts designed to inform Legal-Net users of judges’ deviation from 
prescribed guidelines.150 The alert system is directed both at the “deviant” 
 
 149. Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Reflecting on ODR: The Israeli Example, in 1 EXPANDING THE HORIZONS OF 
ODR: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 5TH INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 13, 15 
(Pompeu Casanovas et al. eds., 2008), http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-430/Paper3.pdf (“In the design of the system, an 
arduous process of mapping the various types of proceedings involved was performed in order to identify, 
step-by-step, the different stages that each of these processes is comprised of.”). 
 150. In the initial level of alert, once a fixed time for the completion of a certain stage of trial expired, 
automatic notification would appear on the judge’s Legal-Net workspace. The alert would escalate once a 
month passed since the initial alert had been issued and the assignment had not yet been completed. In that 
case, an alert would also appear in the workspace of the person who was administratively in charge of the 
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judge (whom the system notifies of her non-compliance) as well as her seniors 
(namely, the president or vice presidents of courts and the Administration). It 
thus serves both as a self-monitoring tool151 and a supervising tool.152  
In short, Legal-Net is able to minutely analyze judges’ performance along 
the judicial processes’ flow-chart and alert any relevant stakeholder (the judge, 
her supervisor, and even litigants, if this option is enabled) of any 
nonconformity with its pre-ordained standards. At the same time, the system is 
capable of generating an overall assessment of possible clogs in the workflow, 
and it provides a tool for assessing increase or decrease in relative workload of 
judges, divisions, and courts. No wonder that it was immediately recognized 
by Okon and the design team that BPM could be an instrument for the 
amalgamation and generation of immense information, such as judges’ 
workload and judicial processes’ duration, broken down into proceedings’ 
separate stages.  
Moreover, it was soon realized that adopting BPM would enable the 
judiciary’s chiefs to take the regulation of judges’ performance to a completely 
new level, one that resembles the (in)famous panopticon.153 Each judge, 
judicial division, court, or the entire judiciary may become unprecedentedly 
 
specific judge’s performance, that is, usually the president of court. According to Yardeni, the Legal-Net team 
made hidden this level of inner escalation in the face of judges’ opposition thereto. Yardeni’s Second 
Interview, supra note 30. The third level of alerts made it possible for senior judges (and not just those who 
“triggered” the alert) to view all of the assignments of their administratively-subordinate judges and 
secretariats. To the best of our knowledge, the third level of alert was never used. See Yardeni’s second 
interview, supra note 30; see also Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 6, at 21–22.  
 151. It is therefore apt to consider this feature of Legal-Net as incorporating a powerful means of reflexive 
regulation in its design. For a discussion on “reflexive regulation,” see Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall 
of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 404–07 
(2004); Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1275–87 (1995); Sagy, supra 
note 119, at 463–67. It is notable that before the creation of Legal-Net, under Arbel’s “Clouds” system, 
deadlines could be delayed and altered by judges—the same judges subject to these deadlines—simply by 
setting new “reminders.” BPM is said to have dealt with this loophole. According to Yardeni, Okon took great 
pains to make it much more difficult for judges to manipulate Legal-Net. Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra 
note 30. Thus, for example, cases could only “move forward” in the system’s flowchart in the sense that a 
judge could not manipulate the system by sending the case a step backwards in the litigation process, for 
example by opening another window for testimonies once this phase of the litigation had concluded. This is a 
major concern for judges who may be quite creative when applying the rules of civil procedure.  
 152. For instance, judges are allowed to “own” up to a certain number of proceedings that are “in limbo” 
before the system begins to issue alerts, namely, cases where, although they are in the summary stage, neither 
dates for future court-hearings are set, nor verdict is pending. This feature is part of an on-going attempt to 
deal with case backlog in the pretrial stage. See Yardeni’s First Interview, supra note 14. 
 153. The panopticon is a (penal) institution designed by Jeremy Bentham so as to allow a single watchman 
to observe all inhabitants (inmates) without those subject to the observation knowing whether at any particular 
point in time they are being observed; they, therefore, have to assume a constant gaze. See 4 JEREMY 
BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM (1843). This idea has been adopted as a metaphor to address a 
state of constant surveillance of the many by the few (without the few knowing whether they are actively 
monitored at any given time). See, e.g., Joshua Fairfield, Escape Into the Panopticon: Virtual Worlds and the 
Surveillance Society, 118 YALE L.J. 131, 131–32 (2009); see also Margo Huxley, Geographies of 
Governmentality, in SPACE, KNOWLEDGE AND POWER: FOUCAULT AND GEOGRAPHY 185 (Jeremy W. Crampton 
& Stuart Elden eds., 2007); Nigel Thrift, Overcome by Space: Reworking Foucault, in SPACE, KNOWLEDGE 
AND POWER, supra, at 53. 
April 2020] THE USE AND MISUSE OF TECHNOLOGY 627 
transparent to the heads of the judicial system (or, in fact, to any node within 
the network, if such a decision is taken). This gaze allows those privy to the 
data to micromanage each and every phase of the judicial process.154 But it 
also means that each of the judges may be micromanaged.155 It is worth noting 
that Legal-Net also tightens the grip over courts’ secretariats, as the heads of 
the system – currently presidents or vice-presidents of courts – are able to 
monitor their court’s secretariats assignments basket, ascertain its precise 
content, and take organizational decisions accordingly.  
As hinted above, Legal-Net does not suffice itself with vertical-top-down 
transparency. Rather, the BPM architecture as developed and applied in Legal-
Net permits multi-directional transparency. Thus, Legal-Net may easily open 
the door to a much more robust peer-review. With its wealth of knowledge 
about each judge, and given the detailed reports Legal-Net produces for the use 
of the judiciary’s doyens, the question of the immediacy and level of 
information one judge may have regarding her peers hinges solely on the 
access-to-information policy adopted, as the technology itself is designed to 
provide full access. The level of transparency allowed by Legal-Net 
corresponds with Okon’s and Barak’s target of achieving full, across-the-board 
internal and external visibility on the national level.156 However, it was decided 
that such a level of statistical transparency, namely the ability to generate 
detailed statistical reports (and analytics), would not be available to all judges 
on the individual-judge level (save their own), but only on a court-level basis 
(or a division-level basis).157 Still, as mentioned, the information is available in 
Legal-Net;158 it is even subject to freedom of information requests.159 
Moreover, even if detailed statistics are available only to the heads of the 
system, every judge is able to view her colleagues’ total number of cases,160 
 
 154. Rabinovich-Einy regards this element of a “learning system” as a positive, since it is conducive to 
efficacy. However, we believe the monitoring element should also be taken into account. See Rabinovich-
Einy, supra note 6, at 5.  
 155. See Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22; Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30.  
 156. According to Okon, Barak thought the judiciary should be transparent to all judges and even to the 
general public. Interview with Boaz Okon, supra note 33; see also Yardeni’s first interview, supra note 14.  
 157. See Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30. 
 158. It seems that in reality, however, it is unlikely that judges (not carrying any managerial functions) are 
savvy enough to know how to mine the system in search of complex information. 
 159. Such information requests are generally based on The Freedom of Information Law. Freedom of 
Information Law, 5758-1998 (1998). A notable case in this regard is AdminA 3908/11 Courts Admin. v. 
TheMarker—HaAretz Newspaper Ltd. Isr. L. Rep. 307 (2012) (Isr.). In that case, TheMarker newspaper 
submitted a Freedom of Information request to the Administration of Courts to receive information indicating 
the number of open cases then under consideration by the Supreme Court and the District Courts, the amount 
of time that had elapsed since each case had been filed, and the names of the judges hearing the cases. Id. at 
314. The State argued that revealing judges’ names would negatively impact their work and decrease public 
confidence in the judiciary. Id. at 312–13. The Supreme Court held that in this case the public interest in 
transparency outweighed the other concerns, reasoning that since the judiciary was one of the branches of 
government having the great impact on individuals, there was a clear public interest in publicizing the 
requested information. Id. at 365. 
 160. According to Yardeni, such viewing is documented by the system. See Yardeni’s Second Interview, 
supra note 30. 
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the status thereof, and therefore can assess (as a rule of thumb) the expediency 
with which judges handle cases. More importantly, each judge can evaluate, in 
any given time, how she or he is performing in comparison to other judges 
based on the number of pending tasks or cases. 
Consequently, it may very well be argued that while courts’ transparency 
stands to enhance accountability, it may also serve to nudge towards 
conformity, thereby raising a possible tension with judicial independence.161 
To illustrate, a procrastinating judge may be subject to direct or indirect 
pressures, either by someone within the system—an administrator, a senior 
judge, even by a peer—or by litigants who may seek to discredit that judge 
publicly. But an efficient judge, facing a complex case—or a case which she 
thinks warrants careful consideration—may be similarly pressured to conform. 
While some delays may be explained, a judge may be put on the defensive if it 
is perceived she is taking too long to process a case compared to the pace of 
others or in comparison to a “thin” understanding of productivity that crudely 
measures the rate of docket clearance.162 It is not inconceivable that judges 
may push parties to settle (especially in complex cases, or if the judge is 
simultaneously processing many simple cases) even when she is not convinced 
this is the best way to resolve the case. More generally, she may make 
procedural decisions under pressure, against her best professional judgment, to 
the extent her assessment of the most adequate procedural disposition of the 
case conflicts with her assessment of what that disposition may look like when 
evaluated only through the single lens of relative efficiency and in relation to 
“the standard.” At the very least, the judge would be facing pressures to 
demonstrate greater productivity, even if such productivity is skewed because 
it is one-dimensional.163  
At the same time, Legal-Net could be understood as enabling a 
“democratizing” effect.164 As noted, Legal-Net generates multi-dimensional 
organizational vectors. While it prioritizes the top-down, hierarchical vector, it 
also enhances the horizontal or even bottom-up gaze, as judges are privy to 
 
 161. See Christof Demont-Heinrich, When the Panopticon Goes Online: Charting the Geography of 
Power, Control and Surveillance in Cyberspace 22 (July 26, 2002), http://www.portalcomunicacion.com/ 
bcn2002/n_eng/programme/prog_ind/papers/0_arribats_peremail/abans_07_2002/pdf/demontheinrich.pdf 
(arguing that over-transparency may undermine judges’ independence, “Individuals internalize the 
panopticized norms and perform them as if someone was surveilling their performance from inside the 
Panopticon.”). 
 162. For a critical analysis of such “thin” conception of productivity, see Hon. William G. Young & 
Jordan M. Singer, Bench Presence: Toward a More Complete Model of Federal District Court Productivity, 
118 PENN ST. L. REV. 55 (developing a set of metrics that account for judicial accuracy and fairness, in 
addition to speed of resolution measures). 
 163. For evidence of how a change in performance metrics led to measurable changes in U.S. federal court 
judicial behavior, see Young & Singer, supra note 162, at 96 (“It is true that the current focus on efficiency has 
skewed judicial activity in demonstrable ways, for example by vastly inflating the number of pending motions 
decided in two weeks prior to semi-annual CJRA [Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990] deadlines.”). 
 164. See Russell Spears & Martin Lea, Panacea or Panopticon? The Hidden Power in Computer-
Mediated Communication, 21 COMM. RES. 427, 427 (1994) (“CMC [computer-mediated communication] 
tends to equalize status, decentralize and democratize decision making.”).  
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internal managerial data. In so doing, it may, in the mid-term or long-term, 
undermine internal hierarchical forces. By providing judges with abundant 
(comparative) information on the production process regarding judges from 
higher, lower, and comparable courts, judges may challenge managerial 
policies and may raise competing organizational demands.  
Yet, to fully appreciate Legal-Net’s revolution, it is necessary to go 
beyond issues concerning its design. The technological and social implications 
of innovation become apparent only once the actual implementation on the 
ground is considered. It is at this stage that technology and the various 
dimensions of culture – organizational, professional, popular – interact, the 
actual impact of new designs become clear, and some unintended 
consequences are revealed.  
V.  THE JUDICIARY’S REACTION—LEGAL-NET IMPLEMENTATION AND 
IMPLICATIONS  
After hearing the needs of the various segments of the system, and after 
the countless hours Okon (and the select few judges) spent in mapping the 
various legal processes, the design team completed the staggering task of 
integrating the processes into the BPM and began introducing Legal-Net to 
judges at large. In May 2004, the team displayed its design to Chief Justice 
Barak and, in early 2005, a series of “road shows” took place in the various 
courts. The objective was to get judges’ feedback and to preempt dissent and 
opposition that might be percolating among judges—a lesson learned from past 
attempts and innovations.165 
Early on, it became apparent that Legal-Net would require extensive 
training for judges. Some judges—primarily veterans set in their ways or less 
acquainted with new technologies, although clearly many veterans did not fall 
into this category—would find the transition difficult.166 The hope was that 
judges would welcome the new features the system promised, such as the 
ability to work from home, to access legal databases, and to greatly improve 
warehousing and scheduling.  
But surprisingly, Legal-Net was met with initial backlash and hostility 
from large swaths of the judiciary—young and old alike.167 Part of the blame 
 
 165. Interview with Boaz Okon, supra note 33; Yardeni, Second Interview, supra note 30. 
 166. A similar approach can be found at Coffin, supra note 73, at 399. Likewise, the challenge and the 
process of individual adult learning was characterized by Smith and Fingar as a “painful experience” since it 
changes long-established work patterns. SMITH & FINGAR, supra note 138, at 166. 
 167. In sharp contrast to the lack of cooperation by judges and secretariats in the lower courts, the 
computation process of the Supreme Court process went quite smoothly. See supra note 60 and accompanying 
text. It seems that the cooperation of Judge Michal Agmon-Gonen, who served at that time as the Registrar of 
the Supreme Court (and as a Judge at the Magistrate Court in Jerusalem) contributed to the success of the 
Supreme Court’s computation effort. Her full endorsement made a difference, since as the Registrar of the 
Supreme Court, Agmon-Gonen was in close contact both with the Court’s secretariat and the Chief Justice. 
Presumably, her engagement was a sign of Chief Justice Aharon Barak’s support. It should be noted, however, 
that the system at the Supreme Court level is not all-encompassing, as justices do not log on to the system to 
630 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:589 
for the harsher-than-expected opposition lied, it appears, in the fact that only a 
small number of judges, secretarial staff, and administration personnel took an 
operational part in design of Legal-Net. Recall that even though Legal-Net 
designers undertook a rigorous analysis of the key components of the legal 
system to identify its constituent parts, only a select number of judges played 
an active role in this process and, despite the outreach for consultation, the 
users’ community at large was not privy to the technical details throughout the 
design stages. That was also true in regard to the political elites of the time: 
Justice Ministers and the Knesset’s Constitution, Law and Justice Committee 
played a marginal role, if any, in the construction of Legal-Net. 
Just as damaging were rumors, which began to spread as Legal-Net took 
its first steps, that the system would upend the very way courts ran. The courts’ 
typists’ workers union went on a strike, following a scare that the advent of 
Legal-Net spelled their massive dismissal.168  
To make matters worse, the system went on-air when it was far from fully 
functional. In fact, the launch was nearly disastrous. The president of the court 
selected for the pilot had to sit at the secretariat and back the system 
manually.169 Fortunately, she did not belong to the skeptics’ camp but was 
rather committed to the success of the system. In addition, funds allocated to 
the training of judges in the ways of Legal-Net were fast exhausted.170 Legal-
Net was proving to be less judge-friendly than assumed. However, going back 
was not an option because the previous system could not be further maintained. 
Consequently, after an eleven-week run, Legal-Net rolled in, despite not yet 
being bug-free.171 
One major source of the commotion accompanying Legal-Net’s 
deployment was already alluded to. It was the realization that technology 
brings with it a language, patterns of interaction, and goods it seeks to 
promote. The introduction of the BPM architecture, accompanying jargon, and 
ways of thinking all challenged established conceptions of the judicial 
function. With the advent of the new techno-managerial design, gone were the 
days when the ethos of the judicial role was encapsulated in the call for judges 
to seek justice under the law in the particular case before them. The focal point 
for the optimization of the judicial compass, in the Legal-Net era, slid from the 
litigants before the courts to the litigants at large. Embedded in the novel 
digitized system is the conceptualization that the judicial process is a service 
provided to the public, which relies, to a large extent, on the integration of the 
various components of the production line, and is therefore measured at the 
system-level (provided no clear miscarriages of justice occur in particular 
 
write their judgements, and it is not designed to offer each judge a view of all the pending cases other judges 
face. 
 168. See Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22. 
 169. See Interview with Boaz Okon, supra note 33. 
 170. See Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22. 
 171. See Interview with Boaz Okon, supra note 33. 
April 2020] THE USE AND MISUSE OF TECHNOLOGY 631 
cases). The arrival of BPM was thus held to epitomize a transformation from a 
consciousness of retail, where the judicial attention was supposed to be fully 
devoted to the quality of the resolution of individual cases, to an attitude of 
wholesale, where the judicial business is contextualized as a manufacturing 
process that is evaluated for its overall success in applying the law to a large 
number of cases as smoothly as possible. This process should therefore be 
managed with the same technological tools (and the same managerial language 
and measures) as other mass-production processes.172  
More specifically, Legal-Net heralded a tectonic shift in the judiciary’s 
work culture and work patterns.173 This shift reflected back on the individual 
judge, who now found herself working in the production line. Until the 
introduction of BPM, ideally, the judge thought she would be valued by the 
quality of her (tailor-made) judgments. Now, Legal-Net offers templates for 
decisions in run-of-the-mill cases. The BPM logic is not only about the quality 
in particular cases; it is about streamlining the process (without getting too 
many “rejects”). According to the new ethos, the judge is in the business of 
managing and efficiently processing conflicts rather than necessarily spending 
a long time pondering on the Solomonic task of making normative rulings 
about what the law is and its nuanced application to the particular case before 
her.174 Consequently, she is nudged to approximate the parameters of the 
judicial production line, at least in terms of the procedural handling of the case, 
as preordained by the Administration and configured into the Legal-Net 
infrastructure. This is not to say that judges do not care about justice in 
individual cases anymore, nor that in previous times managerial pressures did 
not play a role in procedural decisions. But we argue that technology, and the 
technological culture that surrounds it, brought with it a change in kind, and a 
different structure of incentives and organizational culture.175 
A tension thus had emerged between the BPM’s features and the 
normative outlook underlying the Barak-Okon approach. Simply put, the BPM 
technology perfectly fit several—but certainly not all— of the normative and 
operational principles that had been originally envisaged. Significantly, it was 
well suited to rationalizing the judicial process by effectively segmenting it. 
Similarly, the BPM technology enabled and enhanced the transparency and 
accountability sought by Barak and Okon. Nonetheless, BPM was clearly not 
without its difficulties. As suggested, not all of the said normative and 
 
 172. This corresponds with the shifts to managerial justice, wherein judges themselves have to manage, 
rather than simply resolve, disputes. See Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on 
the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 452, 455 (1992); Judith 
Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 378 (1982); However, the focus here is not on judges as 
managers of policy-ridden disputes, but on adjudication itself as reconceived as the provision of a service, just 
like any other service, and therefore subject to similar managerial considerations. 
 173. See Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 6, at 43–44.  
 174. See Agmon-Gonen supra note 4 (arguing that judges now may face pressures from the administration 
to streamline the process, at the expense of justice in individual cases).   
 175. See Rabinovich-Einy supra note 6, at 5 (“A more efficient system could increase access to justice.”). 
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operational principles fully materialized (at least at first). More importantly, it 
soon became clear that BPM carried some unintended normative 
consequences. Whereas it provided a rational basis for justifying distributive 
decisions among judges (or courts) – how many cases are assigned to whom, 
how many resources should be allocated to which department – it also 
reconfigured the underlying premise of the project. No longer necessarily 
seeking the best way to implement the individual right of litigants to access a 
court of law to plead their case, the project now concerned the management of 
a bureaucratic, industrialized public service where scarce public resources have 
to be spread to cover the most parts efficiently. 
**** 
Today, Legal-Net is fully deployed throughout the Israeli judiciary 
(excluding the Supreme Court) and the opposition has significantly waned.176 
Tendencies to complain about it—still common among judges—
notwithstanding, as these lines are written it seems no one can imagine the 
Israeli judiciary operating without Legal-Net. Following the retirement of 
Director Okon,177 Judge Moshe Gal took the helm, bringing with him a 
resolute commitment to the incorporation of professional management 
techniques. After scaling back deployment of Legal-Net in order to debug it, 
he turned his attention to implementation, which included investing 
considerable resources in training and support. Some software modifications 
were also introduced in order to incorporate feedback from various 
stakeholders, including secretariats and judges.178 At the same time, the Chief 
Justice and the Director began realizing the managerial potential embedded in 
Legal-Net. Reports were refined, statistics calibrated, and internal guidelines 
regarding judicial management written.179 The ongoing process of 
improvement and development continues, primarily regarding fine-tuning the 
BPM processes in criminal law and streamlining the logs and inputs required 
by the users in order to improve the usefulness of the statistics.180  
 
 176. Since the main oppositional punch against Legal-Net was thrust when the system was launched, our 
interviews reveal that direct opposition dissipated as the system was rolled-in, bugs were fixed, and 
modifications per the request of judges were included. See Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22; 
Yardeni’s Second Interview, supra note 30. 
 177. Okon stepped down on the July 31, 2006. See Boaz Okon, ISR. JUD. AUTHORITY, 
http://judgescv.court.gov.il/0F8C84BA-645E-E811-8105-0050568A6817 (Heb.) (last visited Mar. 20, 2020). 
 178. See Interview with Moshe Gal, supra note 66; Levy’s Interview, supra note 26. 
 179. See Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22. 
 180. As part of implementing the system, greater flexibility was allowed for the secretariats in classifying 
the various legal proceedings and legal outcomes. The rationale was that some categories are not fully clear, 
and it is better to choose one classification and move on than to spend time to investigate the difference 
between one category and another in classifying the motion, as that would place a burden on the administrative 
staff and hinder implementation. Yet, as the reach and depth of the system expanded, it became even more 
important that such classifications be accurate and precise, in order to ensure reliability of the data. Today it is 
still advisable to corroborate the older data stored in the system with other sources. See Keren Weinshall-
Margel et al., דדמ תריצי  תולקשמלארשיב יטופישה סמועה תכרעהל םיקית  [Case-Weights for The Assessment of 
Judicial Workloads in Israel], 44 MISHPATIM 769 (2015) (Heb.). In constructing this index, the authors came 
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Beyond fine-tuning the existing modules, the IT team is now working in 
coordination with the Judicial Research Unit (an arm of the Administration of 
Courts) and the Chief Justice on the next phase: developing more sophisticated 
measures with which to assess caseload. These tools, once fully developed, 
would serve as a calibrated weight for the judicial workload. The idea 
originally was to assess how “expensive” each judicial proceeding is in terms 
of system resources (primarily judicial time) so that budgetary discussions 
would be data-driven, allocation decisions rationalized, and debates about 
procedural reforms informed. It has evolved, however, to also address the 
expectations from individual judges. Once the weights per set of motions are 
calibrated, judges in different instances will be informed what is expected of 
them in a given time segment, as part of the overall production line.181  
Yet, all along, judges keep looking for creative ways to resist the full 
digitization of the judicial process.182 Our interviews indicate that to this day 
many judges prefer to print some, if not most, trial materials. Furthermore, as a 
matter of course, lawyers continue to submit physical forms in addition to the 
digital submissions, if only to be on the safe side. The number of printers and 
toners has increased in recent years, while the demand for judicial storage 
space mushrooms.183 In the course of our interviews, we were told that less 
than a sixth of all judges (out of a total of about 800) work solely with Legal-
Net electronic files. The rest use Legal-Net partially, and still carry out some 
functions manually in tandem with Legal-Net.184 As indicated above, the 
sources of this resistance may be found in judges’ aversion to novelties.185 
Perhaps the attempt to fully digitize the legal process meets resistance also 
because the technology— primarily the hardware—is not yet fully mature; 
reading materials on a computer screen or an ordinary tablet may seem less 
convenient compared to reading printed materials. We cannot, however, rule 
out that the reason behind the resistance at least in part relates to the 
discomfort with the transformation of the judicial role embedded in the new 
technology.  
CONCLUSION: LEGAL-NET’S REVOLUTION 
The development of Legal-Net, the online digital system for case 
management, is a window to the relationship between regulation, technology, 
 
to the conclusion that they could not rely solely on the data on Legal-Net, and thus corroborated the data via 
other methodologies.  
 181. Interview with Keren Weinshall-Margel, supra note 22. 
 182. See Fred Galves, Where the Not-So-Wild Things Are: Computers in the Courtroom, the Federal Rules 
of Evidence and the Need for Institutional Reform and More Judicial Acceptance, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 161, 
169–73 (2000) (showing similar patterns of resistance in the United States). 
 183. See Interview with Shlomit Levy, supra note 22. 
 184. Nicknamed the “Ezroni file,” namely a hard copy that is printed in order to assist (in Hebrew, “ezer”) 
the judge so that she does not have to scroll endlessly, restricted to limited screen size. 
 185. As was argued by Coffin, supra note 73, at 402 (“[T]here is a need for human judgment in 
determining when technology serves the judicial process and when it begins to dominate.”).  
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and the judicial function. This Article unearthed the development process that 
led to the adoption of the system and revealed the four approaches to 
technology as a regulative tool: (1) the functional approach (technology is but 
a necessary tool to address pressures on critical infrastructure emanating from 
mass demand); (2) the command-and-control approach (technology controls 
the architecture of bureaucracy, and should be used to channel the exercise of 
state power by creating rigid rules of sequential do’s and don’ts); (3) the 
collaborative, integrative approach (technology is a platform for joint decision 
making, and its development is an opportunity to develop an ethos of 
integration and shared organizational identity around a joint mission); and (4) 
the normative, “nudging” approach (technology is a tool for implementing 
values and normative choices, and its design should reflect these choices and 
encourage those subject to the technology to adhere to these values).  
More broadly, the history of the development of Legal-Net is an 
important chapter in the accelerated evolution of technology at the turn of the 
millennia, as different players—private and public—sought to redesign 
processes of communication, information-gathering, knowledge-production, 
and organizational management, and in so doing transformed social practices, 
societal roles, and, to an extent, conceptions of subjects (“data-subjects”) and 
values.186  
This Article thus corresponds with literature on theories of regulation by 
documenting a shift from command-and-control strategies to regulation-
through-information approaches, influenced by managerial considerations and 
thus sensitive to actual performances.187 This is a unique setting to examine 
these questions, as the regulated “industry” is the judiciary—an institution that 
is necessarily associated with being subject to such regulation. Furthermore, 
the unique type of regulation chosen, regulation through information, is 
particularly interesting. Intertwined are elements of self-regulation (judges are 
encouraged to behave according to certain expectations, generated by their 
peers, the professional community, and their superiors), as communicated by 
way of relative ordering of judges’ productivity. It is also interesting as it 
provides information with respect to one measure (such as efficiency) but not 
necessarily with respect to other measures (such as quality, or justice at the 
retail level).  
 
 186. For accounts of the contributions of other key players, see, for example, STEVEN LEVY, IN THE PLEX: 
HOW GOOGLE THINKS, WORKS AND SHAPES OUR LIVES (2011) (showing how Google employees brought 
certain values to their workforce, but were also shaped by the logic of the technology Google developed); see 
also BRIAN MERCHANT, THE ONE DEVICE: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE IPHONE (2017) (providing an account 
of how implementation of existing technologies, coupled with innovative developments, usher in a new 
product that transformed social practices). 
 187. Stephen D. Sugarman, Performance-Based Regulation: Enterprise Responsibility for Reducing 
Death, Injury, and Disease Caused by Consumer Products, 34 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1035 (2009); 
Stephen D. Sugarman, Viewing Equal Educational Opportunity Through the Lens of Regulation Theory 
(unpublished paper presented at the 4th Annual Robert A. Kagan Lecture in Law and Regulation at Berkeley 
Law, Mar. 14, 2018) (on file with authors). 
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As this Article demonstrates, the particular application of certain 
technological architecture brought with it a reconfiguration of the judicial role. 
The use of the BPM structure nudged judges, likely inadvertently, to think of 
their role as part of the assembly line, the business of which is to produce 
dispute settlements under the law.188 This may be regarded as a positive 
development, depending on one’s normative approach toward the judicial 
function. But our findings suggest it was not intended. In that sense, the case 
study is relevant for thinking about “regulation by design.”189 The adoption of 
Legal-Net is an example of such an approach—it was developed with 
“regulation by design,” as the fourth phase of the development reveals. Yet the 
lessons Legal-Net carries are two-fold: first, the development is itself a process 
and therefore subject to uncertainty, thus escaping a predetermined 
comprehensive design. Legal-Net is not a product of a grand design but rather 
a product of different decisions taken at different times informed by economic 
and technological realities, and perception of need and political buy-in. 
Second, and related, the design finally chosen entailed some unintended 
normative outcomes (as well as a certain degree of friction, or resistance).190 
These lessons may thus be relevant to other calls for regulation by design (such 
as calls for better protecting privacy or other values). 
Lastly, this case study is important not only because it allows us to better 
understand the different approaches to the regulative function of technology, 
and not only because these regulative approaches were applied to the 
production of justice (and therein directly touched upon the judicial function). 
It is important because it forces us to consider the relationship (and tension) 
between transparency and professional autonomy. Conceptually, it is unclear 
whether this tension can be captured by privacy because it is not clear whether 
there is expectation of privacy by judges with respect to the exercise of the 
judicial function. However, substantively, the technological gaze, which entails 
the ability of managers, peers, the legal community, and the public to track the 
machination of the “legal assembly line” at a high level of resolution by 
surveilling judges in their courtrooms and chambers, raises concerns regarding 
the pressures to conform to aggregative (wholesale) practices which may be in 
tension with due process at the retail level. It would appear that judges require 
some social space that preserves a buffer from constant monitoring for their 
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deliberation to retain the human dimension of judging.191 This is especially 
pertinent in light of the ability of the system to generate statistical reports and 
mine data for more complex forms of analysis in the future.  
More abstractly, the emergence of Legal-Net demonstrates the dilemma 
faced by the developers acting on behalf of the state—wanting to address the 
need to ensure compliance with productivity while protecting judicial 
independence. Legal-Net harnesses the “nudge” generated by the incentive to 
maintain, or augment, judicial reputation (as a form of professional capital).192 
In so doing, Legal-Net also serves as a managerial tool for “rational” 
distribution of resources, including caseload among judges. This is significant, 
as managers need to maneuver between the various stakeholders as they seek 
to streamline the process in an equitable manner. These stakeholders include 
the individual judges, presidents of courts, and litigating lawyers, but also, for 
example, the Finance Ministry (which wants to ensure data-driven allocation). 
The price, however, is also evident: the new technological environment has 
arguably reconfigured the judicial role towards a more functional 
understanding of service provision. The “nudging” is a form of social control 
that is foreign to the notion of justice in an individual case. Moreover, the new 
ecosystem raises concerns regarding the ability to generate judicial profiles 
that include propensities to handle a case one way or another, including the 
probability to be receptive to certain procedural moves. This may bring about 
deeper concerns for manipulation. 
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